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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN PROSECUTION
Russell M. Gold*
Abstract: Voters were meant to check prosecutors' decisions, but that check has eroded
because voters lack the information necessary to cast meaningful votes in prosecutor
elections. Voters' lack of an effective political check on prosecutors causes two related
problems: (1) inefficient allocation of prosecutorial resources and (2) divestment of
democratic sovereignty from the people. Prosecutors currently need not consider
expenditures for incarceration or public defense because voters never see these costs and thus
cannot hold their prosecutors accountable for them. Accordingly, these costs become an
externality in the prosecutorial decision-making process, causing prosecutors to spend
resources in socially inefficient ways.
To reinvigorate the political check on prosecutors, this Article proposes requiring state
and local prosecutors to disclose costs of all prosecuted cases and all cases not prosecuted in
which an arrest was made and sufficient evidence existed. Such disclosures would sweep
broadly to include prosecutors' wages, public defense costs, and incarceration costs in cases
resulting in a conviction. Voters would then have concrete, monetized evidence of
prosecutorial priorities. This greater information flow would allow voters, through the ballot
box, to meaningfully supervise their prosecutors' exercise of delegated sovereign authority.
Knowing that voters wield this information, prosecutors would then internalize this
externality by taking these previously disregarded costs into account when they determine
whether to charge crimes, what crimes to charge, and what sentences to recommend.
Creating a mechanism that urges prosecutors to consider this broader set of costs would
promote a more socially efficient outcome. Finally, this Article considers what an efficient
allocation of prosecutorial resources might look like. It postulates that many constituencies
would rather spend less on small-scale drug prosecutions to save cash-strapped state budgets.
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INTRODUCTION
State budgets are in crisis, and state prisons are a big reason why. As
of 2009, the total number of inmates in state prisons and local jails
across the nation reached nearly 2.2 million.1 State inmates cost
significant sums of money-figures reach as high as $62,595 per inmate
per year.2 One 2008 study estimated that state prisons in the United
States cost more than $44 billion every year, 3 including $8.8 billion in
California alone. 4 Neither the $44 billion figure nor the $8.8 billion
figure includes spending to house three-quarters of a million people in
local jails.5 These staggering figures prompt the question: would a wellinformed populace 6 choose to incarcerate so many at so high a cost? 7
I. HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS AT
YEAREND 2009-ADVANCE COUNTS 6 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/py09ac.pdf (state prisons); TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009-STATISTICAL TABLES 4 (2010), available at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf (local jails).
2. A recent study by the New York City Department of Correction calculated the average annual
cost for a New York inmate as $62,595. Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable:
Alternatives to Incarcerationin the Era of Mass Incarceration,33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
235,244(2009).
3. David Simpson, National Report on Prisons: Behind Bars: In Georgia,for Every $1 Spent on
HigherEducation, 50 Cents is Spent on Incarceration,ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 29,
2008, at A] (citing JENIFER WARREN, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE
PROJECT, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 11, 30 (2008), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrison08_FINAL_2-1-IFORWEB.pdf).

4. WARREN, supra note 3, at 11, 30.
5. Id. at 27; MINTON, supra note 1, at4.
6. This Article relies in part on Ronald Dworkin's "more sophisticated version of the majoritarian
conception" of democracy, which provides that a viewpoint cannot reflect majority will unless the
people are well informed and have had opportunity to deliberate on the issue. RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 357 (2000).
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Some responsibility for these massive prison costs rests with the
charging decisions of local prosecutors. 8 Locally elected officials and
their employees make these charging decisions while wielding broad
discretion meant to be exercised in the public interest. These officials
must stand for election to preserve the people's check on that broad
discretion. But that check no longer functions properly because voters
lack the information necessary to meaningfully evaluate their
prosecutors' decisions. The absence of a political check poses problems
of inefficient resource allocation and divested democratic sovereignty.
Because prosecutors act on the public's behalf, their decisions should
reflect their constituents' preferences. The efficiency of their decisions
should be judged by the social costs and benefits to their constituencies.
Thus, an efficient allocation of prosecutorial resources is one in which
prosecutions are brought only when their marginal social benefit to a
prosecutor's constituency is equal to or greater than their marginal social
cost to that constituency. But voters' lack of information regarding how
prosecutors spend public funds (and the priorities that information
demonstrates) causes an inefficient allocation of prosecutorial resources.
Lack of a meaningful political check on prosecutors diminishes
0
popular sovereignty. 9 Prosecutors rarely face electoral opposition.' In
7. In last year's State of the State Address, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
criticized his state for spending too much on incarceration and too little on education, proposing a
constitutional amendment to prevent this relative allocation from recurring. Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, State of the State Address (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.govspeech.org/
wwwdata/resources/files/19694d.pdf. Governor Schwarzenegger explained:
The priorities have become out of whack over the years. I mean, think about it. 30 years ago 10
percent of the general fund went to higher education and three percent went to prisons. Today,
almost 11 percent goes to prisons and only 7.5 percent goes to higher education.
Spending 45 percent more on prisons than universities is no way to proceed into the future.
What does it say about our state? What does it say about any state that focuses more on prison
uniforms than on caps and gowns? It simply is not healthy.
Id.
8. This Article's mandatory cost disclosure proposal may appear to blame prosecutors alone for
what this Article hypothesizes is an over-prosecution of nonviolent crime. While prosecutors are
responsible to some extent, they are by no means solely responsible. State legislatures wove a broad
net, and law enforcement officials exercise great control over how to cast that net before prosecutors
even enter the picture. Nonetheless, because prosecutors have the last clear chance to stop the
criminal justice mechanism, this proposal seeks to reinvigorate the voice of the people in
prosecutorial decision-making.
9. See Ronald F. Wright, How ProsecutorElections FailUs, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582-83
(2009) ("[T]he reality of prosecutor elections is not so encouraging.... Uncontested elections shortcircuit the opportunities for voters to learn about the incumbent's performance in office and to make
an informed judgment about the quality of criminal enforcement in their district.... Incumbents
and challengers have little to say about the overall pattern of outcomes that attorneys in the office
produce or the priorities of the office."); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 207-08 (2d prtg. 1970).
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the rare contested election, campaigns focus on a few high-profile cases
rather than address genuine prosecutorial priorities or articulate
alternative visions for prosecution. 1' Voters' choices of candidates in
such elections hardly fit the "sophisticated version of the majoritarian
conception" of democracy that requires a well-informed populace with
opportunity to deliberate.12
More abstractly, sovereignty also suffers because a decision not to
prosecute when cause exists and resources are available embodies an
essential aspect of sovereignty. 13 Such a decision exempts someone from
the purview of otherwise applicable law-a decision at the heart of
sovereignty.14 In a democracy, sovereignty rests with the people.
Because voters lack information about the full costs of prosecution,
however, they cannot meaningfully check their prosecutors and thus lose
5
ultimate sovereign authority over prosecutorial decisions.'
Unlike many previous articles and books that have quarreled with the
breadth of prosecutorial discretion, 6 this Article does not propose a new
mandatory constraint on which cases prosecutors can or must prosecute
but instead proposes strengthening the intended political check. This
Article takes issue with the banality of prosecutor elections and offers a
specific proposal to improve the metrics of prosecutorial performance.' 7
It argues that specific information should be provided to voters and
challengers in prosecutor elections to fix the information deficit that
10. Wright, supranote 9, at 582-83.
11. 1d; Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) ("District attorneys' electoral contests are rarely measured assessments
of a prosecutor's overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil down to boasts about
conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal." (citing Stephanos Bibas, Essay,
Transparencyand Participationin CriminalProcedure,81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 923-31 (2006))).
12. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 357.
13. See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 391, 410-11 (2008); see also GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 17-18 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans.,

1998).
14. Sarat & Clarke, supranote 13, at 391,410-11; see also AGAMBEN, supranote 13, at 17-18.
15. Carol S. Steiker, Passing the Buck on Mercy, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at B7 ("Our
Founding Fathers understood the importance of checks and balances, but no one is checking or
balancing the decisions causing our prisons to overflow.").
16. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 9, at 190; Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policingof Prosecutors:Lessons from AdministrativeLaw, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 895-906 (2009);
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in CriminalLaw, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 371 (2004); Adam
M. Gershowitz, An InformationalApproach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
47, 65-72 (2008); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1560-72 (1981).
17. See Wright, supranote 9, at 606-08; see also Bibas, supra note 11, at 961, 979-96.
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prevents accountability in the office of the prosecutor. 1 Prosecutors
should be required to disclose the full panoply of costs the public bears
19
for each case that was or could have been prosecuted. Such disclosures
would include expenditures on prosecution, public defense, and
incarceration. 20 Also unlike previous scholarship, this Article examines
the problem of prosecutorial accountability in terms of economic
efficiency, revealing externality problems that require mandatory cost
disclosure legislation to achieve optimality.
When voters see the cost side of the prosecutorial efficiency calculus,
they can consider whether their tax dollars are being properly spent.
Knowing that voters will have the information they need to make their
own judgments about prosecutorial efficiency, lead prosecutors who
want to keep their jobs will be forced to consider previously overlooked
costs and move toward a more socially efficient allocation of

prosecutorial resources. Line prosecutors who work for lead prosecutors
will do the same lest they be fired or their bosses voted out.21

18. See Bibas, supra note 11, at 961, 979-96; Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 369, 373 (2010) ("The first step, then, is to make
discretion transparent.... [That] mean(s] publishing better statistics about initial charges, final
charges, recommended sentences, and reasons for charges, plea bargains, sentences, and related
deals."); Wright, supranote 9, at 582-83.
19. In some respects this proposal is similar to Bibas's because he too advocates greater
information to stakeholders in the criminal process, Bibas, supranote 11, at 979-96, but this Article
proposes a specific process for disclosing the relevant information. Moreover, this Article explores
the economic efficiency created by greater flow of information and considers democratic theory
implications of such a proposal. Lastly, it does not purport to dictate effective procedures for
prosecutors' offices but allows each office to structure itself to respond to voters' preferences.
20. Law enforcement expenditures comprise a significant component of government spending on
criminal law. Prosecutors may control much of law enforcement spending, and thus there may be
good justifications to build such spending into a mandatory disclosure regime. But whether the
portion of law enforcement spending due to prosecutorial decision-making can be feasibly separated
from the rest of law enforcement spending and thereby checked in prosecutor elections is beyond
the scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, law enforcement spending is excluded from
mandatory cost disclosures.
21. Although line prosecutors may be career people with greater loyalty to the office than to the
lead prosecutor, line prosecutors nonetheless seem best served by adhering to processes that will
help their bosses avoid hotly contested elections. First, having a lead prosecutor in a tough election
battle might make for a less than ideal work environment. Second, lead prosecutors might fire line
prosecutors who hurt their chances of reelection. See Bibas, supra note 18, at 373-74; William T.
Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 535 (2001) ("District
attorneys are likely to seek to manage their offices in ways that win them public support. To some
degree, line prosecutors will seek to do that too, because that is their bosses' goal, and they must
satisfy their bosses in order to keep their jobs."). Moreover, each newly elected prosecutor brings
the possibility of a personnel shake-up, particularly if this shake-up succeeds in focusing public
attention on prosecutorial decision-making.
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To perfect democratic control over prosecutorial discretion and to
efficiently allocate prosecutorial resources, state and local prosecutors
should be required to disclose total government expenditures or
estimated expenditures for each prosecution. Prosecutors should also be
required to disclose what charges they brought in each case or, in cases
in which the police made an arrest but prosecutors opted not to proceed,
22
what charges they could have brought.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the relevant history of locally
elected prosecutors and the current state of prosecutorial discretion. It
further discusses the economic-efficiency and sovereignty problems
resulting from voters' lack of information about this discretion. Lastly,
Part I discusses the intersection of voters' political check on prosecutors
with other democratic checks in the criminal justice system.
Part II proposes a mandatory disclosure regime to increase the flow of
information between prosecutors and the public they serve. It also
acknowledges the costs associated with this proposal and situates the
proposal in the context of previous proposals for reforming prosecutorial
discretion.
Part III explores the implications of mandatory cost disclosures,
beginning with an explanation of how the increased information would
reach voters and could thus be brought to bear in the voting booth. It
next discusses why disclosing costs would increase prosecutorial
resource efficiency and improve democratic sovereignty. Finally, Part III
considers what a more efficient prosecutorial resource allocation might
look like in practice, postulating, for example, that many constituencies
would rather spend less on small-scale drug prosecutions to save cashstrapped state budgets.

22. This proposal is limited to state and local prosecutors because the political check on federal
prosecutors is weaker in that the people are further removed from the decision-makers. Yet, United
States Attorneys are democratically accountable because they serve at the pleasure of the
democratically elected president. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984). There may be good reason, then, to apply the same mandatory disclosure
regime to federal prosecutors. That topic, however, must be left for another day.
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I.

THE EVOLUTION OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

A.

History and Evolution of ProsecutorialDiscretion

Prosecution by locally elected officials is "an American innovation of
European ancestry., 23 In the eighteenth-century English system, almost
all crimes were prosecuted privately by the victim. 24 The beginnings of a
public prosecution system did not25even begin to.emerge in England until
the end of the nineteenth century.
During the revolutionary period, the American colonies began the
transition from private prosecution to public prosecution by county
officials. 26 By the late 27
nineteenth century, public prosecution was well
established in America.
The next critical development in the United States after the
appearance of public prosecutors was the requirement that they stand for
election.2 8 With this transition, the public vested locally elected
prosecutors with authority to act on its behalf and exercise control that
private citizens previously held. Yet, the people retained the ultimate
check on these elected prosecutors. 29
Locally elected prosecutors embodied the colonial American
preference for local governmental control and suspicion of an overly
powerful central government. 30 By design, citizens remained close to the
23. Robert L. Misner, Recasting ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
728 (1996).
24. David D. Friedman, Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century, 2
U. CHI. L. SCH.ROUNDTABLE 475, 475 (1995).
25. See id. at 476-78.
26. Misner, supra note 23, at 729.
27. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal ProsecutionFunction to Private Actors, 43
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 411, 432-33 (2009); cf Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecutionof
Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J.LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 (1995) (describing
movement toward public prosecution in the nineteenth century, even though it was often
rudimentary).
28. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The DiscretionaryPower of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective,39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1327-28 (2002).
29. Angela J. Davis, Prosecutionand Race: The Power and Privilegeof Discretion,67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 58 (1998); Peggy Nicholson, The Public Outrage Phenomenon and Limits on
Remedying the Effect of Implicit Racist Attitudes on Capital Charging Decisions, 18 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 133, 135 (2010).
30. William T. Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorialDiscretionin the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1342 (1993).
Pizzi describes the relationship between local control and aversion to centralized government in
America:
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prosecutors making decisions on their behalf so that prosecutors were
more likely to understand and respond to their constituents'
preferences. 31 The transition to elected prosecutors was designed to hold
prosecutors accountable to local voters.32
Despite the intent of this transition to elected prosecutors, modem
prosecutors have broad discretion unhinged from any meaningful check.
Judicial review could have constrained prosecutorial discretion, but the
U.S. Supreme Court has squarely foreclosed that avenue. 33 This lack of

But prosecutorial discretion in the American legal system must be seen as part of a political
tradition that is built on a preference for local control over political power and on an aversion
to strong centralized governmental authority and power. There is no better example than our
federal system in which each state retains the power to make its own criminal laws and even to
determine its own system of criminal procedure, consistent with the U.S. Constitution. This
aversion to strong centralized governmental power runs deep in the American political
tradition. It is not an accident that in the United States, in strong contrast with European
countries, something as important as education remains not a state matter, but a local matter,
and different localities may adhere to quite different educational philosophies and objectives.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that local government was more trusted because it was closer to
the people, but he also supplied another reason for strong local government: "Local freedoms...
constantly bring men closer to one another, despite the instincts that separate them, and force them
to aid each other." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY tN AMERICA 487 (Harvey C. Mansfield

& Delba Winthrop eds. & transs., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835). "[Tlhe same individuals are
always in contact and they are in a way forced to know each other and to take pleasure in each
other," and in this respect the familiarity of local government helps people realize that it is in their
own self-interest to withdraw from themselves and engage in the broader community. Id. De
Tocqueville referred to this notion as "self-interest well understood." Id. at 501. Whether the
mistrust of large central government or the desire to structure self-interest and individualism into a
healthy tension was the origin of their design, the framers vested authority in local governments.
3 1. Local election of prosecutors makes particularly good sense from a Tocquevillian perspective
because locally elected prosecutors are most familiar with the constituencies they serve. See DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 501. Further, a small local constituency is most familiar with local
offenses and offenders and has the greatest self-interest in prosecutorial decisions. This self-interest
should engage the people to exercise their check over the use of prosecutorial power at the voting
booth. But voters must see how many of their tax dollars are spent on prosecutions and criminal
punishment to act meaningfully in their "self-interest well understood" and to supervise the exercise
of that authority.
As Ronald Wright recently wrote, "There are reasons to believe that elections could lead
prosecutors to apply the criminal law according to public priorities and values. Voters choose their
prosecutors at the local level, and they care enough about criminal law enforcement to monitor the
work of an incumbent." Wright, supra note 9, at 582.
32. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 207 ("[The lead prosecutor] is usually an elected official, and the
theory is that he is responsible to the electorate."); see also Ramsey, supranote 28, at 1328.
33. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
380 n.l 1 (1982); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980).
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.
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judicial review is reinforced by recognition of absolute prosecutorial
immunity for activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process. ' 34 So it is that "[t]he prosecutor has more control
over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America. His
35
discretion is tremendous."
The structure of locally elected prosecutors that our founders created
remains largely intact. More than ninety-five percent of lead state and
local prosecutors in the United States are elected.36 Despite the U.S.
Supreme Court's recognition that "courts [could be] especially well
qualified to appoint prosecutors," 37 we have not adopted prosecutorial
appointment by the judiciary or elected executives because we place our
faith instead in the political check.38
Local election of prosecutors is a distinctly American creation that
evolved away from a private prosecution system. This system of local
elections represents a choice to vest the public's trust in a single official

Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he balancing of various legal, practical, and political considerations, none of which
is absolute, is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion."); DAVIS, supra note 9, at 24 ("Whether
to prosecute or to refrain from prosecuting X may involve questions of justice, law, facts, policy,
politics, and ethics."). In Newman v. United States, the D.C. Circuit explained that "while
[prosecutorial] discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from
his duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his superiors .... [I]t is not the function
of the judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of the President
himself or those to whom he has delegated certain of his powers." 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
34. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
35. Robert H. Jackson, The FederalProsecutor-HisTemptations, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y
18, 18 (1940); accord Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and
Misconduct, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 24, 25-26 ("Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in
the criminal justice system. Their routine, everyday decisions control the direction and outcome of
criminal cases and have greater impact and more serious consequences than those of any other
criminal justice official."); see also Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 ("In our criminal justice system, the
Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
36. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of
Criminal Prosecutors,46 AM. J. POL. SCi. 334, 335 (2002).
37. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676 n.13 (majority opinion).
38. An empirical study confirms this intuition that the political check can rein in prosecutorial
discretion. Ramsey, supra note 28, at 1392. That study examined murder cases in the New York
District Attorney's Office in the late nineteenth century, concluding that the prosecutions brought
reflected the values of lay society in New York at the time. Id.
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to prosecute on behalf of the people, but the people closely restrain that
authority by requiring the prosecutor to run for office.39
B.

Voters'Lack ofInformation

Poor information flow between prosecutors and the public renders the
political check ineffective. Because prosecutors know that voters lack
sufficient information to check their exercise of authority after the fact,
prosecutors need not account for voter preferences. With no fear of
meaningful reproof from voters, why bother?
Voters currently have insufficient information to meaningfully check
their prosecutors. News stories and press conferences by prosecutors and
defense attorneys allow some measure of evaluation, 40 but such
information is unavailable in the vast majority of cases. 41 Rather,
[t]he reality is that nearly all [the lead prosecutor's] decisions to
prosecute or not to prosecute, nearly all of the influence brought
to bear upon such decisions, and nearly all his reasons for
decisions are carefully kept secret, so that review by the
electorate is nonexistent except for the occasional case that
happens to be publicized.42

39. Id.; see also Wright, supra note 9, at 581 ("At the end of the day, the public guards against
abusive prosecutors through direct democratic control. In the United States, we typically hold
prosecutors accountable for their discretionary choices by asking the lead prosecutor to stand for
election from time to time. This is not true in most places around the globe. In the various civil law
systems in other countries, the idea of electing prosecutors is jarring.").
40. Gordon & Huber, supranote 36, at 336.
41. See Bibas, supra note 11, at 961 ("[P]rosecution is a low-visibility process about which the
public has poor information and little right to participate. District attorneys' electoral contests are
rarely measured assessments of a prosecutor's overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil
down to boasts about conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal. The
advantages of incumbency and name recognition are also huge." (citing Bibas, Essay, supra note
11,at 923-31)); Davis, supra note 29, at 58-59 ("The electorate has very little information about a
prosecutor's specific charging and plea bargaining practices or how he plans to exercise his
discretion before electing him to office ....Elected prosecutors typically run on very general
'tough on crime' themes with no information about specific office policies."); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 751 (2008)
("Although well-publicized cases exist as obvious exceptions, prosecutors make the vast majority of
their charging decisions without any opportunity for public review."); Wright, supra note 9, at 58283 ("[S]tatements [in the typical prosecutor election campaign] ... dwell on outcomes in a few high
visibility cases, such as botched murder trials and public corruption investigations. Incumbents and
challengers have little to say about the overall pattern of outcomes that attorneys in the office
produce or the priorities of the office."); id. at 592 ("[T]he campaign rhetoric offers only poor
measures of competence and few measures of values or priorities.").
42. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 207-08; accord Davis, supra note 35, at 26 ("Even elected
prosecutors, who presumably answer to the electorate, escape accountability, in part because their
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Voters may have access to conviction rates, the number of cases
resulting in pleas, or the proportion of cases brought to trial,43 but these
44
aggregated data obscure the significance of the individual cases.
Moreover, these data do not reveal genuine prosecutorial priorities.
Members of the media similarly lack access to this information.
In the abstract, the benefits of criminal prosecution to voters are
obvious. For violent or other high-profile offenders, citizens see
dangerous people locked up and fewer criminals roaming the streets.
The associated costs, however, are far less apparent. 46 An average citizen
does not and cannot know how much it costs to charge, prosecute, and
incarcerate a criminal.47
C.

Problems Caused by Lack of Information

Allowing prosecutors to discount the will of the people presents
problems of both efficiency and democratic sovereignty. First, and most
directly, prosecutorial resources may be spent inefficiently, that is, spent
in ways in which the marginal cost to the voting public exceeds the
marginal benefit. Second, the ability of prosecutors to remain indifferent
to public opinion about costs divests the people of sovereignty.
1.

Inefficient Allocation of ProsecutorialResources

Because American prosecutors are elected officials trusted to act on
the public's behalf,48 their resource allocation decisions should be those

most important responsibilities-particularly the charging and plea bargaining decisions-are
shielded from public view.").
43. Gordon & Huber, supra note 36, at 337.
44. Even the data Wright advocates to solve the information deficit are aggregated beyond the
point of usefulness. See Wright, supranote 9, at 606-08.
45. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 342. Admittedly, monetizing and particularizing these
benefits to particular cases is difficult.
46. Id.at 342.
47. Although statistics regarding the cost of incarceration are ascertainable, the cost of
prosecutorial resources expended to review a case, charge it, plea bargain or go to trial, respond to
an appeal, and pay a public defender is far more opaque. As Douglas Berman explains, "Long
missing [from our criminal justice system] has been a sober realization that even if we get
significant benefits from incarceration, that comes at a significant cost." Monica Davey, Touching
Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at Al.
48. See supra Part I.A.; see also Wright, supranote 9, at 581 ("When government officials have
discretion, the rule of law also requires that they be accountable. This ideal carries even into the
world of criminal justice, where the individual prosecutor's power dominates the scene. We hope
that every exercise of prosecutorial discretion takes place within a framework of prosecutorial
accountability.").
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that their constituents would make. Resource decisions that match
constituents' cost-benefit preferences are socially efficient. By
efficiency, this Article refers to the traditional economic definition:
marginal benefit equals or exceeds marginal cost. An efficient allocation
of prosecutorial resources is one in which a prosecution is brought only
when its marginal benefit to the public equals or exceeds its marginal
cost. An inefficient prosecutorial resource allocation, then, is one in
which voters would prefer that their resources be spent differently. 49
With the historical shift to public prosecution, the complexity of the
decision whether to prosecute a particular person for a particular offense
increased dramatically. In a private prosecution system, the decisionmaker was the most significant stakeholder and made his prosecutorial
decisions out of self-interest. 50 Public prosecutors, however, must
approximate popular will and account for the interests of a broad
constituency. 51 The public prosecutor's decision-making process should
address a far broader spectrum of considerations than a victim's does.
Instead of examining their own preferences to determine whether a
prosecution would be worth its cost to them individually, prosecutors are
saddled with the responsibility to make calculated decisions on behalf of
their communities.
This added complexity engendered a potential private efficiency loss
but a social efficiency gain. In a system of private prosecution,
efficiency was achieved through the aggrieved individual's private
decision. If prosecuting was worth at least as much to the aggrieved
party as the cost of the prosecution, then the aggrieved would pursue the
case. When the primary stakeholder was the person making the decision,
the cost-benefit calculation was simple (albeit deceptively simple in

49. A skeptical reader might wonder whether this notion of voters' cost-benefit analysis
mischaracterizes the way that the public views criminal law and overestimates voters' concern for
the costs of law enforcement. But this Article contends that voters do not always desire more arrests
and prosecutions; rather, it contends that voters exposed to cost information might decide that
certain prosecutions are a waste of money. For a more detailed explanation, see infra Part Ill.
50. Broader societal interests were neglected in this decision, but the largest stakeholder's
interests were naturally accounted for. The grand jury also functioned as a backstop to determine
whether charges could go forward in serious cases, see Friedman, supra note 24, at 476, but cases
could not proceed without the victim's assessment that the case was worth bringing.
51. Victims' interests continue to play a role in prosecutors' decisions. See STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.2(h) (1993), available

at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminaljustice section-newsletter-home/crimjust-sta
ndards_pfuncblk.html#3.2; Jean Ferguson, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Use of Restorative
Justice Programs in Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L.

BRIEF, Summer 2009, at 3, 7. Thus, the prosecutorial decision has not been wholly wrested from the
victim's hands, but ultimate decision-making now rests with a disinterested official.
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failing to account for the external costs and benefits to other
stakeholders). In a public prosecution system, prosecutors estimate and
aggregate the benefits to their constituencies-including victims-but
estimation leaves room for error and thus inefficiency. Although this
public prosecution model may achieve less efficient outcomes from
victims' private perspectives, it accounts for benefits exogenous to the
private prosecutorial model, including public safety and general
deterrence.
Under our current system, the monetary costs of prosecution are
multifaceted. How much public funding went into the prosecution or
would have gone into the prosecution had it been pursued? How much
was spent or would have been spent on a publicly funded defense? What
will incarceration cost for the sentence imposed or what would it have
cost for a likely sentence? 52 How much did appeals or collateral review
cost? Although these costs are not generally quantified for the public,
they are largely quantifiable.
The benefits in the current system, however, are considerably more
amorphous and more difficult to objectively monetize. The benefits of
prosecution are those traditionally considered the animating concerns of
criminal law: incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and
comfort to victims. 53 But the benefits of a particular prosecution to
residents of a particular county can only be weighed and valued by each
resident individually.
Voters currently see only a vague abstraction of prosecution's
benefits, and they lack concrete cost information. Voters may thus
erroneously perceive prosecutions as costless, or at least far less costly
than they actually are. Because voters do not fully perceive the costs of
prosecution, lead prosecutors need not fear that voters will consider
costs in upcoming prosecutor elections. Prosecutors thus need not

52. Admittedly, when no mandatory minimum sentence is in play, this estimate takes a good deal
of guesswork by prosecutors. But perfection is not necessary. That prosecutors must estimate and
consider these costs and then reveal their thinking to voters achieves the efficiency and democratic
accountability goals of this Article.
Considering the cost of each individual prosecution might seem odd because many prosecutors
are not paid for each case individually. Rather, lead prosecutors receive an upper bound on
expenditures, and they are free to make decisions so long as they do not exceed that funding limit.
Lead prosecutors may even have a fixed number of employment positions to fill or fixed salary
levels. But the particular allocation of funds or the number of prosecutors in a particular office are
fixed costs only in the short run. In the long run, they are variable. If prosecutorial budgets are
sufficiently large that cases are brought in which voters view their marginal cost as exceeding their
marginal benefit, voters will seek to tighten prosecutorial budgets in future years.
53. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 325.
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consider voters' efficiency preferences when determining which cases to
pursue.54

Prosecutors presumably already analyze costs and benefits when
making charging or other decisions, but they have no incentive to
include the full panoply of costs in this calculus. They instead would
rationally limit their costs to only those that their offices would incur or
their constituencies would see. This constriction creates an externality
problem: prosecutors may impose undue costs on their constituencies
that prosecutors are not forced to internalize in their decisions because
they do not fear reproof from voters. Absent sufficient information about
prosecutors' performance, not only are citizens unable to cast informed
votes, but there cannot be meaningful electoral incentives for
prosecutors to conform their decisions to their constituents' actual
preferences.5 5
Voters' lack of information about prosecutorial costs helps explain
the one-way ratchet of ever-tightening American criminal law
enforcement. 56 Increased enforcement continues "even in the face of
expert opinion that harsher sentences may not produce additional
deterrence and that other approaches may be more fruitful. '57 The most
powerful criminal justice interest groups seek harsher treatment of
crime;58 however, countervailing desires for cost control could
strengthen opposing interest groups.59
54. This Article's proposal helps to remedy a situation in which "opacity and insularity allow
prosecutors to avoid serving victims and the public faithfully." Bibas, supranote 11, at 963.
55. See id at 989 ("Better information might also help voters to monitor their agents.").
56. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 21, at 509 ("How did criminal law come to be a one-way ratchet that
makes an ever larger slice of the population felons, and that turns real felons into felons several
times over? The conventional answer is politics. Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals;
politicians respond with tougher sentences (overlapping crimes are one way to make sentences
harsher) and more criminal prohibitions."); see also Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It?
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal FactorsInfluencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23, 29 (1997) ("The epithet 'soft on crime' is the
contemporary equivalent of 'soft on Communism."'); Brown, supra note 16, at 330-31 ("[T]he
particular interest group pressures on criminal law aggravate the trend toward harsh punitivism and
the criminal justice administration's failure to respond rationally. Prosecutors face pressure mostly
from victims and a public concerned about becoming victims; legislators face lobbying from that
same public, as well as from prosecutors. Save for the occasional public scandal from prosecutorial
overreaching (consider wrongful conviction cases or publicity of punishments far outside public
sentiment), there is little effective pressure from the defense side to moderate government policy on
criminal justice.").
57. Beale, supra note 56, at 31.
58. Brown, supra note 16, at 330-31.
59. Defense-oriented groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and Families Against
Mandatory Minimums could benefit greatly from increased information flow regarding criminal law
enforcement. Moreover, groups promoting legalization and decriminalization of marijuana may gain
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Prosecutorial discretion without available information necessary for
an effective political check lacks a mechanism to create efficient
resource allocations. 60 It is possible that the benefits of every case
currently prosecuted are so high that the costs would not offset them in
voters' minds, but that accidental efficiency outcome flies in the face of
and seems unlikely given the strength of crimeprevailing scholarship 61
groups.
interest
control

increasing traction as these movements come to be seen as revenue generators or at least cost savers
in times of difficulty for state budgets.
60. That an efficient allocation of prosecutorial resources is desirable does not rest merely on
economics' constant striving for efficiency. Desire for a more socially efficient use of prosecutorial
resources perhaps partially animated the move from private to public prosecution. In this regard,
consider Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson:
Mr. Olson may or may not be guilty of a crime; we do not know. But we do know that the
investigation of him has been commenced, not necessarily because the President or his
authorized subordinates believe it is in the interest of the United States, in the sense that it
warrants the diversion of resources from other efforts, and is worth the cost in money and in
possible damage to other governmental interests; and not even, leaving aside those normally
considered factors, because the President or his authorized subordinates necessarily believe that
an investigation is likely to unearth a violation worth prosecuting.
487 U.S. 654, 703 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Just as the independent prosecutor did not face the
same responsibility to consider all the costs and benefits of a prosecution, recent literature has
criticized the inefficiency of privately brought qui tam suits. See, e.g., Sharon Finegan, The False
Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, CorporateIntegrity Agreements
and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625 (2007) (arguing that
inefficiency in qui tam suits results because the prosecutor is not a public official who brings a case
when the benefit to the public is greater than or equal to its cost, but rather a private citizen who
balances only the costs and benefits to himself, leaving a highly inefficient social outcome); see also
Michael Rich, ProsecutorialIndiscretion:Encouragingthe Department of Justice to Rein in Out-ofControl Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1251
(2008) (raising similar concerns).
61. E.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (2009) ("There is a
tipping point at which crime increases if too many people are incarcerated. The United States is past
this point. If we lock up fewer people, we will be safer."); Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing
Crime?, 2008 WiS. L. REV. 1049, 1091 (2008) ("[A]ny further increases in incarceration beyond
[2008] levels would actually create more crime than they would prevent."); Rough Justice,
ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 13 (arguing that in the United States "the cost of imprisoning
criminals often far exceeds the benefits"); Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners,ECONOMIST, July
24, 2010, at 26, 26 ("Justice is harsher in America than in any other rich country."); see also
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *83-85 (E. &
N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (overcrowded prisons threaten rather than protect public safety), enforced,
2010 WL 99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), appeal docketed sub nom. Schwarzenegger v.
130
Plata, No. 09-1323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and considerationofjuris. postponed,__ U.S. _,
S.Ct. 3413 (2010); Beale, supra note 56, at 31 (harsher enforcement continues even in the face of
evidence that harsher sentences do not produce additional deterrence).
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Divestment of Sovereignty

The combination of broad prosecutorial discretion and uninformed
voters also presents a democratic sovereignty problem.62 Prosecutors
exercise sovereign authority when they determine who may be punished
for legal transgressions and who will not. Allowing prosecutors to
exercise this delegated sovereign authority is acceptable in a democracy
only insofar as the people retain the ultimate authority to oust
prosecutors if they disapprove of their decisions. 63 When the people lack
the information necessary to meaningfully check their prosecutors,
prosecutors become unjustifiably powerful.
Prosecutors face a constant stream of decisions regarding whom to
prosecute and for what crimes from amongst many cases in which there
is sufficient evidence to bring charges. Prosecutors lack sufficient
resources to bring all charges supported by probable cause in all cases. 64
Accordingly, prosecutors must decide whom not to prosecute even
though they have sufficient cause. That decision exempts certain people
65
from the valid reach of the law.
Deciding whom to exempt from the reach of valid legislative
enactments is the essence of sovereign prerogative. 66 Prosecutorial

62. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under our system of government, the
primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one."). Although Justice Scalia was referring
to federal prosecutors, that the primary check is a political one holds also for state and local
prosecutors.
63. See Davis, supra note 35, at 29-30 ("Everyone who believes in democracy has a vested
interested in assuring that no one individual or institution exercises power without accountability to
the people. For some reason, we have given prosecutors a pass-allowing them to circumvent the
scrutiny and accountability that we ordinarily require of those to whom we grant power and
privilege while affording them more power than any other government official.").
64. Fairfax, supra note 41, at 732 ("Discretion is the backbone of the criminal justice system. The
administration of criminal justice is not wooden and mechanical-there are far too many criminal
laws and far too many offenders for society's limited police, prosecutorial, judicial, and penological
resources. Therefore, actors in the criminal justice system must exercise some discretion in deciding
which individuals to arrest, prosecute, convict, and punish."); see also DAVIS, supra note 9, at 164
n.4 ("[R]eform of existing criminal statutes is an obvious prerequisite to substantially full
enforcement. Anything approaching full enforcement of present statutes would be unthinkable.").
65. That prosecutors possess such power to discretionarily choose not to proceed likely has its
origins in the writ of nolle prosequi. Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of ProsecutorialDiscretion in
Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 18-25 (2009); Sarat &
Clarke, supranote 13, at 401.
66. "Decisions of prosecutors are quintessentially sovereign acts in that they are moments when
officials can decide who shall be removed from the purview of the law." Sarat & Clarke, supra note
13, at 410-11; see also AGAMBEN, supranote 13, at 17-18.
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discretion is thus an essential aspect of sovereignty. 67 Under this
theoretical framework of prosecutorial discretion as a core aspect of
sovereignty, prosecutors act as agents of the sovereign-or as surrogate
sovereigns68-within a democratic government because their
discretionary authority not to prosecute exempts citizens from the reach
of the law.69

Conceptualizing prosecutors as surrogate sovereigns appears-at first
glance-to be in substantial tension with the notion that sovereign
authority in a democracy rests with the people.7 ° Yet having elected
prosecutors who exercise discretion has long been a facet of American
criminal law. 71 This American tradition embodies a conscious choice to
delegate sovereign authority to 72locally elected prosecutors to pursue
criminals in the public's interest.

67. Sarat & Clarke, supra note 13, at 391 ("By declining prosecution even when there is probable
cause, prosecutors have the power to create exceptions to the reach of valid law-a power that
signals the kind of lawlessness that is at the heart of sovereignty."); see also Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Executive has the power (whether or not it
has the right) effectively to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure to prosecute-the
exercise of so-called prosecutorial discretion."); Fairfax, supra note 27, at 431 (citing Sarat and
Clarke for the principle that democratic authority is a "fragment of sovereignty"); Andrew B.
Loewenstein, Judicial Review and the Limits of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
351 (2001).
68. Sarat & Clarke, supra note 13, at 406 (discussing Montesquieu and Locke conceptualizing the
prosecutor as a "surrogate sovereign").
69. Id.; see also BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 77, 80-81 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner Publishing Company 1949) (1748) ("In monarchies, the prince is the party that
prosecutes the person accused, and causes him to be punished or acquitted.... [T]he prince, who is
established for the execution of the laws, appoints an officer in each court ofjudicature to prosecute
all sorts of crimes in his name."); cf. Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1557 (the prosecutor acts as the
government's representative). Many scholars have described the prosecutor through this agency
lens. See Bibas, supra note 11, at 979 (discussing other authors applying the same lens).
70. "When one wants to speak of the political laws of the United States, it is always with the
dogma of the sovereignty of the people that one must begin." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at
53. There is something rather American about embracing this notion of popular sovereignty at the
root of our democracy:
In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the people is not hidden or sterile as in certain
nations; it is recognized by mores, proclaimed by the laws; it spreads with freedom and reaches
its final consequences without obstacle.
If there is a single country in the world where one can hope to appreciate the dogma of the
sovereignty of the people at its just value, to study it in its application to the affairs of society,
and to judge its advantages and its dangers, that country is surely America.
Id.
71. See supra Part I.A.
72. Pursuit of the public interest is the essential function of the prosecutor. Steven K. Berenson,
Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public
Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 792 (2000). While at present prosecutors may not act perfectly in
conjunction with the prosecutorial preferences of their constituencies, they nonetheless attempt to
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This choice reflects an American preference for political control over
public officials rather than internal hierarchical controls. 73 "If someone
is to decide which laws will be aggressively enforced, which laws will
be enforced occasionally, and which laws will never be enforced, it
makes sense that the person who has to answer to the voters will make
those determinations. 74
Ceding discretionary authority to a delegate is logistically necessary
and beneficial,75 but if this authority runs unchecked, it risks
degenerating into "absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled
standing laws. 76 From a Lockean perspective, such power is anathema
to good government.77

Preserving this great sovereign power in the hands of all rather than
allowing it to rest in the hands of one protects against arbitrary
governance. 78 An elected official gained day-to-day authority to exercise
exercise their authority to serve the public's interest. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 69, at 81 ("The
public prosecutor watches for the safety of the citizens.").
73. Pizzi, supra note 30, at 1338.
74. Id. at 1339.
75. See infra Part II.A.
76. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT

§ 137, at 185 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993) (1690).
77. "[M]en would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for" a situation in which their lives,
or perhaps their liberties, were at equal or greater risk. Id.; accord Sarat & Clarke, supranote 13, at
405.
It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or
more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the
magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them: this were to put
themselves in a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend
their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it,
whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination.
LOCKE, supra note 76, § 137, at 185. Locke described the state of nature, that is, the "state all men
are naturally in," in part as a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking
leave, or depending upon the will of any other man:
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another: there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species
and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same
faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless
the lord and master of them all, should by any manifest declaration of his will set one above
another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty.
Id. § 4, at 116.
78. LOCKE, supra note 76, § 137, at 185. This Article does not advocate democratic control over
the office of the prosecutor in the sense that political influences, as Vorenberg feared, "enter into the
decisions prosecutors make and that they may deal harshly or gently with particular individuals for
political reasons." Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1558. There is a critical distinction here between
"political influences" in the negative sense of prosecuting or refraining from prosecuting certain
individuals versus political influences in the positive sense of prosecutors targeting certain types of
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sovereign power, but this delegation remained consistent with the notion
of the people as the democratic sovereign because voters were meant to
closely check this authority. 79 Without a meaningful political check,
"[n]o uniform, pre-announced rules inform the defendant and control the
decision-maker; a single official can invoke society's harshest sanctions
on the basis of ad hoc personal judgments." 80 Without a political check,
a mere technical violation could rise to the level of an indictable
offense; 81 crimes that voters abhor but that are expensive to prosecute
could go uncharged. But this fear of a single prosecutor's arbitrary
whims is dispelled somewhat when a meaningful political check exists
prosecutor will not then possess untrammeled sovereign
because the
82
authority.
D.

Other Mechanisms of DemocraticAccountability Failto Control
ProsecutorialDiscretion

Electing prosecutors is not the only democratic check on enforcement
of the criminal law, though other existing checks are not alone sufficient.
offenses that their constituencies consider particularly heinous. See Sandra Caron George,
ProsecutorialDiscretion: What's Politics Got to Do with It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 75152 (2005).
79. Wright, supra note 9, at 589 ("Note that democratic control of prosecutors takes its most
powerful form: local control.... The local prosecutor remains close to the community, where
democratic accountability is thought to be strongest."); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist.
of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) ("The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is
made by a publicly accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations and under an ethical
obligation, not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to serve the cause of
justice."); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987) ("Between
the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That
state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given
individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation
and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance
that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility
for the attainment ofjustice.").
80. Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1555.
81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 98 ("Openness is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally
in the fight against injustice."); see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933)
("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.").
Vorenberg's concerns regarding the lack of due process afforded to defendants by this system of
broad ad hoc prosecutorial discretion are alleviated in part by the mandatory cost disclosure
proposal because prosecutors have greater incentive to act in accordance with their constituents'
views. Nonetheless, implementing majority will is no guarantee of due process for particular
defendants. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30 (discussing tyranny of the majority). Thus, the
scope of this proposal, while directed at enhancing democracy, is not coextensive with Vorenberg's
or Davis's due process concerns.
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The voice of the people also emerges through grand and petit juries,
further demonstrating that the people were meant to retain ultimate
control over who should suffer the moral approbation and liberty
deprivation of a criminal conviction. Nonetheless, the grand and petit
juries were not meant to and cannot carry the torch of democratic
accountability alone. Voters' choice of a local prosecutor remains a
necessary feature of preserving democracy in criminal prosecution.
Several articles have persuasively argued that the grand jury was
meant to inject the citizen's voice into the criminal charging process.
The relevant history demonstrates that the grand jury was intended to
provide a democratic check. 83 "Where the grand jury truly adds value is
through its ability to exercise robust discretion not to indict where
probable cause nevertheless exists-what might be termed 'grand jury
nullification."' '84 This democratic check includes authority to take issue
with the wisdom of a particular criminal law and prevent its application
in any context or to "determine that its application to a particular
defendant or in a particular community is unwise., 85 A "grand jury
might nullify in response to what it perceives to be an unfair or unwise

allocation of limited prosecutorial resources., 86 The grand jury has also
been described as the "injection of the laypeople's perspective-the
voice of the community-into the charging process. 8 7

83. See Fairfax, supra note 41, at 729 (identifying the grand jury as a vehicle for local input and
power); id. at 720 ("[T]he grand jury is not limited-by either tradition or constitutional design-to
merely screening criminal cases for probable cause .....
84. Id. at 706 (emphasis omitted).
85. Id. at 713.
86. Id. "[T]he grand jury may exercise its discretion to send the Executive a message about its
preferred allocation of law enforcement and prosecutorial resources. This discretion also can be
brought to bear on exercises of prosecutorial discretion in specific cases." Id. at 728.
87. Susan W. Brenner, The Voice Of The Community: A Case For Grand Jury Independence, 3
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 67, 121 (1995). Case authority supports this description of the grand jury's
role. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (explaining that the grand jury's role is
broader than merely determining probable cause and encompasses discretionary decisions regarding
which crimes to charge); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (discussing the grand
jury's "special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement"); id. ("It is a grand inquest, a
body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by
doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime."
(quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919))). But see Bracy v. United States, 435
U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., denying stay) (stating that the grand jury's role is limited to
assessing probable cause); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir.
1983) (same); United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (same).

2011]

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN PROSECUTION

Although the grand jury was historically intended to serve as a
democratic check, it is far from adequate to hold prosecutors
accountable.8 8 First, the United States Constitution does not provide a
89
right to grand jury indictment prior to state prosecution, and no such
90
right exists in many states. Moreover, the grand jury is comprised of a
small group of people who may not provide a fair cross-section of the
populace such that the grand jury's will represents that of the people
overall. 91 Further, a prosecutor who fails to secure a grand jury
indictment can present the case to another grand jury and hope that it
will return a true bill, repeating this process until the prosecutor succeeds
92
because jeopardy does not attach before the grand jury. For these
88. Niki Kuckes labeled the grand jury's somewhat hybrid role as that of "democratic
prosecutor." Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor:Explaining the ConstitutionalFunction of
the FederalGrand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1300 (2006). Much of the conception Kuckes advances
of the grand jury derives from a dissent written by the now-Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Alex Kozinski. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896,
900-01 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part).
Working from the insights Judge Kozinski suggested and Judge Hawkins endorsed, this Article
argues that modem criminal procedure would benefit from a conceptual clarification of the federal
grand jury's role-from an express recognition that the grand jury serves, in a sense, as a
"democratic prosecutor." This clarification suggests that the grand jury is best seen, in the words of
Judge Learned Hand, simply as the "voice of the community accusing its members." Kuckes, supra,
at 1300 (quoting In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y 1910)).
89. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
90. In more than half the states in the country, indictment by grand jury is merely one available
mechanism for charging non-capital cases. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 30; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 2.2; ARK.
CONST. amend. 21, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737, 859 (West 2008);
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 8; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-101 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-45, 54-46
(2001); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; HAW. REV. STAT. § 801-1 (2007);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 8; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/111-2 (2006); IND. CODE
§ 35-34-1-1 (1998); IOWA CODE § 813.2, Rules 4, 5 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201 (1995);
LA. CONST. art. I, § 15; MD. CONST. DECL. RTS. art. 21; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-103
(LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.1 (2000); MINN. R. CRiM. P. 17.01; MO. CONST. art.
I, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 20; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-101 (2009); NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 10; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1601 (1995); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 7; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 10; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-6-1 (2004); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13; VT. R. CRIM. P. 7; WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 25; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.05 (1998); Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The GrandJury Legal Advisor:
ResurrectingThe GrandJury's Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1174 (2008). Of these
thirty states, four guarantee grand jury rights in capital cases. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 15; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.01; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7. Because many states do not afford a
grand jury right, defendants can only hope that this democratic check is available in their particular
cases. In many cases, however, grand jury indictment will not be available and thus will provide no
democratic check, further supporting the need for a meaningful democratic check elsewhere.
91. Roger Fairfax's recent article notes that there is no guarantee that grand juries and petit juries
would nullify in the same case because the members of each group will consist of different
individuals with different perspectives. Fairfax, supranote 41, at 756.
92. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992); Fairfax, supranote 41, at 743.
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reasons, the grand jury alone cannot sufficiently inject the will of the
people into charging decisions.
Other commentators discuss the petit jury as a democratic check on
prosecutorial discretion. 93 Yet, the petit jury's role is less effective at
protecting defendants from the ineffective allocation of prosecutorial
resources than is the grand jury. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the
petit jury as a check is the great number of criminal cases that end in
plea bargains. 94 A prosecutor can anticipate that a petit jury would not
intercede to block an inefficient resource allocation in most cases. The
prosecutor thus need not work to avoid that check. Moreover, by the
time a petit jury is called upon, a defendant has already been charged
and undergone a criminal trial, so that even if acquitted, many resources
have already been expended and the defendant has already suffered
practical consequences.95 Although prosecutors may exercise some
93. Paul Butler argued that petit jury nullification provides jurors a way to exercise their
conscience and counteract racial injustices. Paul Butler, Essay, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995).
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is guilty of the crime
with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by
the facts of the case or the judge's instructions regarding the law. Instead, the jury votes its
conscience.
In the United States, the doctrine of jury nullification originally was based on the common
law idea that the function of a jury was, broadly, to decide justice, which included judging the
law as well as the facts. If jurors believed that applying a law would lead to an unjust
conviction, they were not compelled to convict someone who had broken that law. Although
most American courts now disapprove of a jury's deciding anything other than the "facts," the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits appellate reversal of a jury's
decision to acquit, regardless of the reason for the acquittal. Thus, even when a trial judge
thinks that a jury's acquittal directly contradicts the evidence, the jury's verdict must be
accepted as final. The jurors, in judging the law, function as an important and necessary check
on government power.
Id. at 700-01 (citations omitted). Jury nullification has an old history, dating back most famously to
Bushell's Case, where the English Court of Common Pleas determined that a juror could not be
punished for acquittal even when the trial judge believed the verdict contradicted the evidence.
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). Butler goes so far as to argue that when AfricanAmerican jurors consider a case with an African-American defendant, "in cases involving
nonviolent, malum prohibitum offenses, including 'victimless' crimes like narcotics offenses, there
should be a presumption in favor of nullification." Butler, supra, at 715. For these purposes it is
sufficient to note that the petit jury can serve as a democratic check in the criminal justice system.
94. See Barkow, supra note 16, at 882 ("As a result of [the pressure to plea bargain] and costs of
exercising trial rights, the trial is an insufficient check on prosecutorial power."); Bibas, supra note
11, at 983; see also Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United
States Legal Practice,54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717 (Supp. 2006) (stating that more than 95% of
cases end in plea bargains).
95. That practical consequences arise merely by being indicted underlies the ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct regarding duties of the prosecutor. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
cmt. 4 ("[T]he announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe
consequences for the accused .. "). This is the same stigma that former defendants face following
an acquittal. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. U. L.
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modicum of charging restraint anticipating the petit jury as a check, that
anticipation does not provide sufficient democratic accountability to
justify prosecutors in exercising delegated sovereign power.
Accordingly, the combination of grand and petit juries does not
sufficiently check prosecutorial resource allocation. Were these juries
sufficient, democratic election of prosecutors would never have been
necessary. But the Framers chose to place the prosecutorial power in the
hands of an elected official, thus adding an additional structural check.
Electing prosecutors created a political check meant to support and
supplement the grand and petit juries in allowing the people to retain
control of the criminal justice system. Thus, despite the role of the grand
and petit juries in creating some measure of democratic accountability,
mandatory cost disclosures are necessary to return voters to their
intended role of making informed choices in checking prosecutors.
II.

MANDATORY COST DISCLOSURE AS A MEANS OF
ENHANCING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Although inefficiency and divestment of sovereignty are significant
concerns, these concerns do not lead necessarily to the conclusion that
prosecutorial discretion should be eliminated. Instead, this Article seeks
a return to the intended origins of prosecutorial discretion, arguing for a
stronger political check on its exercise by requiring prosecutors to
divulge their case-by-case expenditures to the public. This information
would then find its way into the public eye in distilled form through
prosecutor election campaigns and the news media.
A.

ProsecutorialDiscretion Is Necessary and Beneficial

Prosecutorial discretion is both necessary and beneficial in our current
criminal justice system. Much of its necessity derives from overlapping
provisions in criminal codes.96 Prosecutors necessarily have broad
authority over which charges to select when several can apply. 97 The

REV. 1297, 1305 (2000) ("For most innocent defendants, it does not take long to realize that the
stigma associated with an arrest and criminal charge does not easily wash away. Those close to the
defendant might know the truth, but neighbors, acquaintances and co-workers may always wonder
about the real basis of the acquittal or dismissal.").
96. As Angela Davis writes, "One of the reasons prosecutorial discretion is so essential to the
criminal justice system is the proliferation of criminal statutes in all 50 states and the federal
government." Davis, supra note 35, at 28.
97. This would not hold true if prosecutors were required to charge all applicable offenses, but
that is certainly not the case. As Judge Gerard Lynch put it:
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breadth of criminal statutory law that necessitates prosecutorial
discretion derives from the temptation to pass ever more crime-control
legislation. 98 Because there is no political benefit from appearing soft on
crime and because there may be quite a cost, 99 politicians compete for
the tough-on-crime label100 by continually "enacting ever more
numerous, more severe, and more expansive criminal laws."' 0 1
Because the government plays a significant role in criminal
sentencing, prosecutorial discretion substantially impacts the length of

So long as our criminal codes contain too many prohibitions, the contents of which are left to
be defined by their implementation, or which cover conduct that is clearly not intended to be
punished in every instance, or which provide for the punishment of those who act without
wrongful intent, prosecutors must exercise judgment about which of the many cases that are
technically covered by the criminal law are really worthy of criminal punishment. (And, given
the number of legitimate cases that could be brought, so long as crime rates remain high and
the resources devoted to criminal justice remain inadequate to deal with them all, prosecutors
must also make decisions about which cases constitute the best use of limited judicial and law
enforcement resources.)
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117,
2136-37 (1998) (citations omitted).
The overlapping criminal codes and the related decision of which crime to charge do not
comprise the only dimension of prosecutorial discretion. Enmeshed in the decision of which of
several overlapping statutes to charge, and perhaps subsumed by that decision in part, is the decision
whether to charge any crime at all. Both decisions place great authority in prosecutorial hands, and
both decisions thus find themselves at the center of this Article.
98. Id.at 2137; see also Stuntz, supra note 21, at 509 ("How did criminal law come to be a oneway ratchet that makes an ever larger slice of the population felons, and that turns real felons into
felons several times over? The conventional answer is politics. Voters demand harsh treatment of
criminals; politicians respond with tougher sentences (overlapping crimes are one way to make
sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions." (citations omitted)); Wright, supra note 9, at
585 ("Instead of confining the work of prosecutors, criminal codes add to their power. As the years
pass, the legislature expands the legal tools available to prosecutors. Criminal codes tend to cover
more behavior and increase the range of punishments that could attach to conduct that is already
declared criminal."). Some attribute the peak of the crime-control wave to the tremendously
successful Willie Horton campaign ad in 1988. Laura Sullivan, Shrinking State Budgets May Spring
Some Inmates, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld= 02536945.
99. "'[S]oft on crime' is the contemporary equivalent of 'soft on Communism."' Beale, supra
note 56, at 29. The political cost of the soft-on-crime label has received no shortage of discussion.
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of
Constitutionalityor PresumptionofInnocence?, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1203, 1250 n.179 (2006); Pritikin,
supra note 61, at 1105-06.
100. Barkow, supra note 16, at 880 ("Congress continues to pass mandatory minimum sentencing
laws even though there is uniform agreement by experts-including the United States Sentencing
Commission-that these laws are unwise and lead to greater disparity in practice because of the
power they vest in prosecutors. Members of Congress support these laws because they do not want
to be viewed as soft on crime or resistant to prosecution demands." (citations omitted)); Lynch,
supranote 97, at 2137-38.
101. Lynch, supra note 97, at 2137.
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sentences. 1° 2 Where mandatory minimum sentences exist, the
discretionary charging decision essentially controls what sentence a
particular defendant will receive. 0 3 Three-strikes laws vest similar
authority with prosecutors.
Prosecutorial discretion is also beneficial. It provides an alternative to
full enforcement, which would be impossible given limited
°4
prosecutorial, judicial, penological, and law enforcement resources.
Even if it were possible, full enforcement of current criminal codes
could prove disastrous given their broad reach.'0 5
Beyond the practical necessity for discretion to implement broadsweeping criminal codes, prosecutorial discretion also allows criminal
justice enforcement to change with changing societal preferences.
Discretionary authority allows prosecutors to treat cases individually,
results to unique facts and circumstances of particular
"tailoring
06
cases." 1
But just because discretion is necessary and beneficial does not mean
that unfettered discretion is necessary or consistent with democratic
102. Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have UnderminedEffective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 88
(2003).
103. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorsas Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 324 (2009) [hereinafter Punishment Theorists]; Michael A. Simons,
ProsecutorialDiscretion in the Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 19
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377, 384-85 (2010) [hereinafter Advisory Guidelines]; see also
Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liabilityfor Supervising Prosecutors:Applying
the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009) (discussing prosecutorial authority in determinate sentencing
schemes); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
ProposalsFor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 565-76 (1978)
(same).
104. Fairfax, supra note 41, at 732 ("Discretion is the backbone of the criminal justice system.
The administration of criminal justice is not wooden and mechanical-there are far too many
criminal laws and far too many offenders for society's limited police, prosecutorial, judicial, and
penological resources. Therefore, actors in the criminal justice system must exercise some
discretion in deciding which individuals to arrest, prosecute, convict, and punish." (citations
omitted)).
105. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 164 n.4 ("[Rjeform of existing criminal statutes is an obvious
prerequisite to substantially full enforcement. Anything approaching full enforcement of present
statutes would be unthinkable."). In the four decades since Davis's book was first published, the
scope of criminal statutes has assuredly not decreased.
106. Id. at 17; see also id. ("Even when rules can be written, discretion is often better."); id. at 25
("Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice.... Rules alone, untempered by
discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modem government and of modem justice....
Discretion is a tool only when properly used ....); Bibas, supra note 18, at 370 ("Even in a world
of unlimited resources and sane criminal codes, discretion would be essential to doing justice.
Justice requires not only rules but also fine-grained moral evaluations and distinctions.").

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:69

governance. 0 7 When voters lack meaningful information with which to
check the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, efficiency and sovereignty
problems arise. 0 8 This proposal targets that lack of information
regarding use of prosecutorial resources.
B.

Contours of Mandatory Cost Disclosures

To enhance the democratic check on prosecutorial discretion and
increase the efficiency of prosecutorial resource allocation, this Article
proposes that states adopt mandatory cost disclosure statutes. Such a
statute would require prosecutors to disclose cost information for all
prosecutions actually brought and for potential prosecutions in which an
arrest is made and cause exists to proceed but no charges are brought.
These costs would include both monetary and non-monetary costs. Such
cost disclosures would provide concrete, monetized data on
prosecutorial priorities so that voters could meaningfully assess their
local prosecutors' decisions. 109
107. Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1522 ("[It is] anomalous at best that, in a system dedicated to
due process, great and essentially unreviewable powers are vested in the prosecutor.").
Davis acknowledges that discretion is necessary but argues that a lesser degree of discretion
would be both preferable and plausible. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 188-93. His basis for concluding
that lesser discretion is plausible rests on a questionable comparison to the European model. Id.
Comparisons to the European model run the risk of obscuring the primary difference between the
American and European models-the accusatorial versus inquisitorial system. William Pizzi
persuasively argues that this difference requires a greater degree of discretion in the American
system. Pizzi, supranote 30, at 1352-53 ("Judicial review of prosecutorial power is workable in the
civil law tradition because the roles of the judge and the prosecutor are very different in that
tradition and because the nature of criminal trials are different in that tradition. First of all, judicial
review of a prosecutor's decision to charge or not to charge faces no separation of powers principle
in the civil law tradition.... There is thus no separation of powers problem in putting a civil law
judge in the position of closely supervising the prosecutor and, given the civil law judge's
responsibility to develop the evidence at trial, it seems natural to give the civil judge the power to
control charging discretion. This power extends even to reshaping the charges to more accurately fit
the evidence at trial."). To fill a void that would exist if broad prosecutorial discretion were
restricted, a judge would necessarily be required to exercise broader authority over charging
decisions, a feature incompatible with our accusatorial system. Id.at 1353 ("To ask that an
American judge play a similarly aggressive role with respect to charging decisions raises serious
separation of powers problems and runs contrary to the adversary tradition in which judges are
assigned a neutral and passive role with respect to charging decisions and the development of
evidence at trial. If we wish to limit prosecutorial power and 'reform' our prosecutors to fit the civil
law model, we would have to reform our concept of judicial power to fit the civil law model as
well." (citations omitted)).
108. See supra Part I.C.
109. Mandatory cost disclosures also serve the same purpose as the Government in the Sunshine
Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); id. § 2 ("[T]he public is entitled to the
fullest practicable information regarding the decision-making processes of the Federal
Government."); H.R. Rep. No. 94-880() (1976) (discussing making government "fully accountable
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When a prosecutor charges a case, the required disclosure should
begin with the result of the prosecution. If the prosecution was pursued
to verdict, what was the verdict? Cases appealed should include the fact
of the appeal, who brought it, and its disposition.
Required disclosures should include an itemized list of all costs to the
public. This cost accounting begins with the money spent paying the
prosecutor." 0 Although prosecutors are often not paid hourly, adequate
disclosure would require each prosecutor to approximate an hourly wage
and apply that wage to the number of hours spent on each case.
For defendants represented by appointed counsel, the cost disclosure
should include the cost of the defense attorney, itemized separately from
the prosecutor's actual or approximated wage. For public defenders,
these costs will require a similar prorating of an attorney's hourly wage
multiplied by the number of hours the attorney spent on the case. For
appointed counsel working on a contractual basis, wages might be paid
hourly, and thus the cost calculation would not require additional work.
Fees paid to or time spent by an investigator should also be disclosed.
For both the prosecution and defense, costs of trial logistics such as
preparation of exhibits should be included. Disclosures should include
any public funds expended on transportation costs for the prosecutor,
defense attorney, or the defendant.
Another cost to disclose is money paid to witnesses. Many expert
witnesses are paid hourly, so the cost of their testimony will be easy to
calculate. For witnesses such as police officers or other government
employees not retained solely to testify in court, the cost of their
testimony would be any additional amount beyond their usual salary that
to [the people] for the actions which it supposedly takes on their behalf'). The procedural,
information-forcing statute proposed in this Article is meant to facilitate an effective democratic
check and parallels the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970); Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966); see also Dep't of the
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) ("[T]he basic purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act [is] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." (quotation omitted)); Albert C. Lin,
Clinton's National Monuments: A Democrat's Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 732
(2002) ("The public notice and participation requirements of NEPA have a strong democratic
element in their emphasis on direct citizen participation."); Loma Jorgensen, Note, The Move
Toward ParticipatoryDemocracy in Public Land Management Under NEPA: Is it Being Thwarted
by the ESA?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 311, 315 (2000) ("NEPA's strength lies in its
democratization of Federal administrative law. NEPA mandates public and interagency
involvement. It thereby empowers citizens with the information they need to meaningfully
contribute to the environmental decision making process." (quoting 139 Cong. Rec. E2342 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Owens))).
110. As explained above, whether and how to build law enforcement costs into this model falls
outside the scope of this Article. See supra note 20.
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they are paid to testify or to prepare to testify. For witnesses on the
public payroll whose occupations consist solely of testifying and
preparing to testify, their approximate hourly wage should be calculated
using the method described above for prosecutors and public defenders.
For cases resulting in a conviction, subsequent disclosures should
include the likely public expenditures following conviction, including
incarceration. After sentencing, the prosecutor can better calculate the
likely duration of the defendant's sentence and can accordingly make a
revised determination of the likely costs of incarceration. Appellate
costs, when applicable, should also be disclosed. But because appeals
are not filed in some cases and because some appeals require much more
attorney time than others, appellate costs should not be disclosed until
they are sufficiently definite and certain, perhaps only once they have
already been incurred. Appellate costs should also include costs of
collateral review. All disclosures in a case need not occur
simultaneously, but later disclosures should be cumulative of earlier
disclosures.11"
The non-monetary costs of every prosecution should also be
disclosed. Because by definition these disclosures cannot be objectively
monetized, the required reporting should be in non-monetary terms to
allow each voter to weigh these costs individually. Non-monetary costs
include collateral consequences such as whether the defendant is a
parent, and, if so, whether the defendant is a custodial parent. Even for
non-custodial-parent defendants, there may be a cost of lost child
support that they will be unable to afford if incarcerated. Ideally, such
reporting would include the added caretaking costs the state incurs upon
incarcerating a custodial parent, but those costs may be too nebulous to
12
ascertain given the variety of caretaking situations that might arise.'
111. That these disclosures might not be complete for several years after the case is completed
appears at first glance to present a bit of a weakness in the cost disclosure proposal. After a several
year period, individual prosecutors might not be in the same job such that voters can hold them
easily accountable. But opportunities for accountability remain on two fronts. First, those same
statistics could still be brought to bear in campaigns against those prosecutors if they are running for
higher office. Second, in prosecutorial campaigns in the same jurisdiction, the candidates could be
asked to evaluate the earlier cost-benefit decisions, and voters could consider their candidacies
accordingly.
112. Whether a parent should serve a lesser sentence than a non-parent for the same crime is by
no means an easy question of punishment theory, nor is the answer assumed in this discussion.
Rather, the answer will emerge through the aggregation of informed voter sentiment in each
community. In other words, if voters think a parent of a small child should serve a lesser sentence
than a similar offender without a child, they can vote out their prosecutor for treating the two
offenders similarly. Or perhaps voters might wish these two offenders be treated similarly and hold
their prosecutor accountable for treating them differently. Whatever the preferences of each local
constituency, there is hardly a reliable way to discern voter sentiment without the disclosures
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Most of these required disclosures are sufficiently definite and easily
monetized, but it is essential for voters to understand which prosecutions
were foregone in favor of others. This aspect of prosecutorial
discretion-those cases a prosecutor does not bring-is most hidden
from public scrutiny. 1 3 Thus, prosecutors should also be required to
disclose information similar to that described above for prosecutions that
they opt not to pursue despite an arrest and sufficient evidence.
Cases that prosecutors opt not to pursue after an arrest fall into two
categories: cases of insufficient evidence and cases with sufficient
evidence not worth the cost to pursue. Prosecutors need not report the
cases that they chose not to prosecute for lack of evidence or cases in
which no arrest is made. The threshold decision of whether probable
cause exists to believe that an accused has committed a crime does not
require prosecutors to assess social costs and benefits or exercise what is
typically viewed as prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, assessing
probable cause is not an exercise of sovereign authority because it does
not remove people from the reach of otherwise applicable laws. 114
Determining probable cause is the necessary first step in evaluating
whether any laws may apply to particular conduct. Only after satisfying
this threshold requirement do prosecutors exercise sovereign authority
by exempting some people from the reach of otherwise applicable law
when they decide not to prosecute."15 Mandatory cost disclosures seek to
check this latter step-the genuinely discretionary exercise of sovereign
authority. Thus, mandatory cost disclosures need not include cases in
which prosecutors concluded that they lacked sufficient evidence to
proceed with charges.
For cases in which an arrest was made and sufficient evidence existed
but the prosecutor opted not to paper the case or to drop charges later,
the disclosure report should first indicate the charges that could have

proposed here. Those voter preferences are likely ignored at present because they are exogenous to
a prosecutor's charging calculus.
113. DAVIS, supranote 9, at 189-91; see also Gordon & Huber, supra note 36, at 336.
114. "Decisions of prosecutors are quintessentially sovereign acts in that they are moments when
officials can decide who shall be removed from the purview of the law." Sarat & Clarke, supra note
13, at 410-11; see also AGAMBEN, supra note 13, at 17-18.

115. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 ("The prosecutor in
a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause.").
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been filed or were filed but later dropped. 16 Second, it should indicate at
what point the prosecution was terminated. Third, it should include
estimated costs based on the likely expenditures on the prosecutor and,
where applicable, on publicly funded defense counsel. Fourth, based on
the charges that could have reasonably been brought, the report should
indicate the estimated cost of incarceration had the case resulted in
conviction. Disclosures in cases not brought will provide perhaps the
greatest insight into prosecutorial priorities. These disclosures should
exclude identifying information to avoid creating public records of
people who could have been but were not prosecuted. 117
C.

Costs of Cost Disclosures

Requiring prosecutors to disclose the costs of each prosecution is not
itself costless, though the benefits are sufficient to overcome the added
costs. Relevant costs include publicizing the reported data and preparing
1 8
the reports. Although publication costs would be largely insignificant,"
the added time costs are not negligible, though that time would be spent
improving democratic governance.
Prosecutors will likely spend more time than before weighing the
benefits of a particular prosecution against a broader set of costs to
estimate constituent preferences. But prosecutors already make resource
allocation judgments, 19 so this proposal does not add a requirement of
whole cloth; it merely adds to an existing process.
It is perhaps impossible to quantify the added time costs of this
proposal without actually implementing it in some pilot capacity. The
point cannot be lost, however, that prosecutors would spend this added
time considering how to wisely use scarce government resources to
satisfy constituent preferences. Thus, while there are added transaction
costs, those costs are generated in service of the democratic process.
Admittedly, the cost-benefit calculus is difficult and carries some
uncertainty, which itself can be seen as a cost. How is a prosecutor to
know a likely sentence for a particular offense in advance? How is a
116. Because of overlapping criminal codes, numerous charges could be brought on most sets of
facts. See supra Part II.A. Nonetheless, prosecutors should list all charges that could have been
supported by the evidence but were not filed.
117. See Leipold, supranote 95, at 1305 (discussing the stigma of a charged defendant).
118. Reporting itself need not be costly. Cost disclosure reports can be posted on the internet to
save a great deal on paper and ink. An online posting would also make the data easier to access.
119. Lynch, supra note 97, at 2139. As one commentator framed this cost-benefit analysis,
prosecutors will prosecute only where the cost of pursuing the prosecution and the harm to the
public do not outweigh the harm caused by the defendant. Rich, supranote 60, at 1253.
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prosecutor to monetize the societal benefit from convicting and
incarcerating any given offender? Voters face a tough enough task
attempting to monetize their own preferences. Prosecutors are one step
removed from the public's monetary valuation of these costs and
benefits, but they must nonetheless estimate and evaluate the relevant
voter preferences.
In assessing the potential costs of cost disclosures, it is important to
remember that this proposal does not require disclosure of every case a
prosecutor ever considered papering. Prosecutors should only be
required to disclose information regarding cases they actually pursued
and cases they opted not to pursue despite an arrest and sufficient
evidence. This proposal is narrowly tailored to address the truly
discretionary sovereign decisions that prosecutors make. Moreover, the
benefits of promoting an informed populace and a meaningful check on
prosecutorial authority, thereby returning ultimate sovereign authority to
the people, outweigh these costs.
D.

DistinguishingPrevious Proposals

Numerous scholars have unsuccessfully urged prosecutorial discretion
reform,1 20 but this mandatory cost disclosure proposal has several less
intrusive facets than its predecessors. Importantly, it provides increased
democratic accountability, giving it a greater chance of political success.
Further, this proposal focuses on the costs of prosecution. And because
cost savings are more alluring now than at any time in recent memory
given the struggling economy, troubled state budgets, and fiscal austerity
measures, the proposal offers lawmakers one potential way to limit
government expenditures.
Requiring disclosure of information from particular cases is far less
burdensome to prosecutors than requiring them to create prospective
policy statements. 12 Prosecutors need only evaluate each case to ensure
that they or their bosses could defend it in an election campaign.
Mandatory cost disclosures need not compel any consistent policy.

120. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 9, at 189-90; Barkow, supranote 16, at 895-906; Brown, supra

note 16, at 371; Gershowitz, supranote 16, at 65-72; Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1560-72.
121. See Bibas, supranote 11, at 962 ("[M]ost [scholars] favor external regulation of prosecutors
by other institutions. One strand of this scholarship, exemplified by James Vorenberg's work, favors
legislation to restrict prosecutorial discretion ex ante.... [Tlhese external, institutional controls
have proven to be ineffective. Legislation is too crude, and ex post review of individual cases is too
narrow, to attack the deeper, systemic problems with patterns of prosecutorial discretion."); see also
Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1562-63 (urging prosecutors to create specific guidelines explaining
how they will exercise discretion given a particular set of facts).
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Rather, prosecutors can assess each case individually without weaving it
into a broader framework or policy.
Legislating for all potential cases in advance requires prescience and
is thus impractical if not impossible.1 22 Using prior prosecutorial
decisions as binding precedent would also bind prosecutors' hands too
tightly. 123 Perhaps it seems fairer to force prosecutors to make all
decisions consistently, but prosecutors need flexibility to make different
decisions as circumstances or political preferences change-an essential
24
benefit of prosecutorial discretion.'
This proposal intrudes less on prosecutorial prerogatives than its
predecessors. It does not require the legislature to force prosecutors into
certain decisions.125 It instead necessitates legislative action only to
require prosecutors to inform voters of their decisions and the
accompanying costs. 126 Mandatory cost disclosures leave prosecutors

free to make discretionary decisions that may have repercussions if
voters disagree.
Further, mandatory cost disclosures would not overly limit
prosecutorial discretion, forcing judges to fill the remaining vacuum
with more expansive judicial power127-a
role inconsistent with
122. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 37 ("Beyond the intellectual power of any judges or legislators
is the capacity to write rules that will be satisfactory for all future cases without knowing the facts
of such cases.").
123. See id. at 190 (raising possibility of a system of prosecutorial precedent). Using
prosecutorial actions as "guidelines and policies" is far less burdensome and encourages the free
flow of information necessary for democratic governance. Bibas, supra note 18, at 374-75.
Nonetheless, this Article does not advocate memoranda explaining deviations from prior precedent.
See id. When voters are concerned or an election challenger questions an incumbent prosecutor
regarding a particular case, the prosecutor would then be forced to defend her actions in that case,
and this additional discourse would provide voters a sufficient stream of information without
imposing a greater burden than necessary on prosecutors.
124. See supra Part H.A. Perhaps it is not surprising that this Article's proposal diverges sharply
from Davis's or Vorenberg's because this proposal seeks democratic accountability and efficiency
rather than protection of due process. That a democratic result can slight due process is hardly
controversial. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 239-64 (discussing tyranny of the majority).
Due process concerns are beyond the objectives of this Article.
125. See Brown, supra note 16, at 371.
126. Once legislatures see prosecutorial expenditure statistics, they may opt to exercise greater
oversight authority and control via legislation. This too would be an improvement from a
democratic theory perspective because a representative body would control the broader policy
decisions. Admittedly, legislation might diminish prosecutorial discretion in individual cases, which
could force prosecutors into making inefficient decisions. But even if such decisions are inefficient
individually, the broader scheme of prosecutorial priorities would more likely embody voter
preferences as the voters would no longer face cost blindness, and thus implementation of
prosecutorial priorities would be more efficient overall.
127. A shift of discretionary power from prosecutors to judges would reflect the axiom that
power abhors a vacuum.
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separation of powers. 128 This proposal therefore constrains discretion
without violating separation of powers. 129
Also unlike one previous proposal, mandatory cost disclosures do not
rely on social psychology in the hope that prosecutors will change their
decision-making when presented with additional information about the
conditions of their states' prisons.130 Instead, mandatory cost disclosures
align prosecutors' incentives with voters' interests. Depending on the
psychology of each individual prosecutor to alter her behavior based on
additional information is largely undependable because it lacks any
meaningful external enforcement mechanism.131 Our prosecutorial
system was designed to rest ultimate authority in the people's hands by
allowing local voters to check their prosecutors' decisions. Mandatory
cost disclosures return voters to that intended position.
Legislators should have greater motivation to adopt this proposal than
its predecessors because it enhances democracy, does not overly restrict
prosecutors, and can save. money. 32 Legislators can pitch these cost
disclosures to their constituents by emphasizing that they give voters

128. Pizzi, supra note 30, at 1353 ("To ask that an American judge play a similarly aggressive
role with respect to charging decisions raises serious separation of powers problems and runs
contrary to the adversary tradition in which judges are assigned a neutral and passive role with
respect to charging decisions and the development of evidence at trial.").
129. Such separation of powers concerns derive from the premise that the prosecutorial function
is traditionally executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Mandatory cost disclosures risk neither legislative overreaching into prosecutorial
decisions, the very concern animating the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, nor
judicial overreaching incompatible with the adversarial system.
130. See Gershowitz, supra note 16, at 67 ("Although it is impossible to say for certain whether
an informational campaign would have any effect on prosecutors' charging decisions, there is a
body of social psychology literature that gives cause for optimism."). Gershowitz suggests
alleviating prison overcrowding by requiring state bureaucracies to inform prosecutors about (1) the
total number of incarcerated prisoners, (2) the change in number from previous years, (3) the
percentage of prisons at or exceeding capacity, and (4) whether any prisons are under court orders
regarding overcrowding. This added information, he suggests, will alter prosecutorial decisionmaking-a proposition that he supports largely through social psychology literature. Id at 65-72.
131. See Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1525 ("Even when bargaining is not involved, however,
there are good reasons to see prosecutors' virtually unlimited control over charging as inconsistent
with a system of criminal procedure fair to defendants and to the public. This is especially true
because the recent and successful attacks on the discretion of sentencing judges and parole and
corrections authorities have had the effect of increasing prosecutors' powers.").
132. As a general matter, Bibas seems correct that "legislatures lack the interest and incentive to
check prosecutors vigorously; they would rather be seen as prosecutors' allies in the fight on
crime." Bibas, supra note 11, at 968. But legislatures do have an incentive to pass legislation that
empowers voters (so long as the added power does not come at the expense of legislatures) because
voters seem to like the idea that they control their government. This incentive could trump
legislatures' general reluctance to regulate prosecutors.
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more control over their government.1 33 This proposal does not tie
prosecutors' hands by requiring them to adhere to formal guidelines or
replicate previous decisions. Moreover, it has the potential to save state
and local governments money that is now spent in ways voters may not
approve. In a time when states already divert offenders into alternative
courts to avoid costly incarceration and California is releasing prisoners
under court order,' 34 these savings seem increasingly desirable.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF MANDATORY COST DISCLOSURES

A.

From DisclosureReports to the Voting Booth

Publishing reports on the costs of prosecution puts the democratically
necessary information into circulation, but questions remain: How will
this information reach voters and how might they use it in the voting
booth? It seems unlikely that many people will read countless pages of
itemized cost disclosures even if they are widely available on the
internet. But voters will nonetheless receive the information contained in
those pages. Challengers in prosecutor elections, the news media, and
certain interest groups have strong incentives to read these disclosure
reports and publicize their findings. These groups will distill the relevant
information or concentrate on particular cases, giving voters more
digestible data.
Challengers to incumbent prosecutors have a powerful incentive to
comb cost data for inefficient cost-benefit decisions or for evidence of
prosecutorial priorities out of line with those of the voters. Such
instances would provide fodder for a meaningful campaign attack on the
incumbent's decisions or priorities. Just as a government's priorities are
best revealed through its budget, so too are a prosecutor's priorities best

133. This proposal does not run afoul of Bibas's criticism:
[H]oping for legislatures to rein in prosecutorial discretion is a pipe dream. Legislatures have

strong incentives to give prosecutors freedom and tools to maximize convictions and minimize
costs. For example, legislatures broaden criminal liability, pass overlapping statutes, and raise
punishments to give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining chips. By doing so, they drive down the
cost and increase the certainty and expected value of each conviction. Prosecutors can thus
convict more defendants and procure longer sentences for the same amount of time and money.
This increase in efficiency serves legislators' interest in being tough on crime and prosecutors'
interest in maximizing convictions while minimizing workloads.
Bibas, supranote 11, at 966.
134. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *116
(E. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), enforced, 2010 WL 99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), appeal
docketed sub noma. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and consideration
ofjuris postponed,__
U.S. ___ 130 S.Ct. 3413 (2010); Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 28, 2009 Cal.
Stat. 4392.
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revealed by examining how she allocates her funds. With this
information available, prosecutor election campaigns could provide1 35a
priorities.
forum for meaningful discourse about crime-control
Contrast such campaign discourse with that of current prosecutor
election campaigns comprised of vague attacks on the conviction rate-a
statistic that reveals little about prosecutorial priorities-or discussion of
one high-profile case from the past term. 136 Also, when prosecutors run
for higher office, challengers could use those prosecutors' previous
disclosures to reveal their priorities to the voters.
State and local governments have made significant budget cutbacks to
compensate for depressed tax revenues resulting from the recession.
They have cut funding for social services, education, police, and
countless other areas. In a cost-cutting climate, voters are more sensitive
to government waste. Media outlets have an incentive to monitor
government waste to capitalize on this sensitivity (and on the usual
distaste for government waste) by publicizing particularly egregious
instances. 137 Mandatory cost disclosure reports would provide one
source for these stories of waste. When a newspaper reporter sees
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars spent to enforce a
three-strikes or mandatory minimum law for possession of a small bag
of marijuana, it makes sense to run an article highlighting the
opportunity costs of that decision. It is not difficult to imagine a local
newspaper spread with photos of shuttered schools, laid-off police
officers, and foster parents unable to put food on the table juxtaposed
with a photo of a "dime bag" of marijuana.
Many interest groups also have incentives to cull cost disclosure
reports to generate statistics or capture anecdotes that advance their
respective causes. Teachers' unions could pick out an expensive case
and question whether prosecuting one individual was worth laying off a
dozen teachers. They could question whether putting a few more drug
users behind bars is really worth forcing elementary schools to put thirty
138
could
service agency
Social generated
classes.
kindergarten
students
on the reports
baseddirectors
and statistics
reports
use these indisclosure

135. See Wright, supra note 9, at 582-83.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Sam Allen & Abby Sewell, Bell is Not the Only Big Spender, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2010, at A33; Jeff Gottlieb & Ruben Vives, Is a City Manager Worth $800,000?, L.A. TIMES, July
15, 2010, at Al. Just as with FOIA disclosures, the media would channel information to the public
eye. See Michael Russo, Are Bloggers Representatives of the News Media Under the Freedom of
Information Act?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 227 (2006).
138. See Sacramento Schools to Cut 430 Jobs, Increase Class Sizes, ABC NEws 10 (Mar. 5,
7 6 60 3
.
2010), http://www.newsI 0.net/news/localstory.aspx?storyid=
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to lobby for budget increases. Drug legalization or decriminalization
groups could discern the average cost of a drug prosecution or publicize
particularly expensive prosecutions to promote their cause. These and
other interest groups would gain the concrete information necessary to
launch meaningful public campaigns to shift budgetary priorities,
potentially combating the trend of continually increased law
enforcement. Even though voters may not have personally read
prosecutors' cost disclosure reports, they would get distilled versions of
this cost information from these interest group campaigns. This distilled
information could meaningfully impact voters' choices at the ballot box
in the next prosecutor election.
Voters could benefit from the meaningful debates about crime-control
priorities that cost disclosures would promote. These debates would arise
in the media, in prosecutor election campaigns, and in public interest
group campaigns as groups vie for scarce government funding or public
support. Using information from these sources, voters could then
meaningfully assess whether their elected prosecutor is spending their
money as they wish or whether someone else would likely do better.
B.

Efficiency and Sovereignty Improvements

1.

Efficiency

Mandated disclosures would inform the voting public and force
prosecutors to account for the full panoply of societal costs. This
calculated anticipation would thus help prosecutors reach a socially
efficient allocation of resources. Prosecutors already weigh costs and
benefits before making charging decisions, but the factors in their
current calculus are unduly limited. Prosecutors currently need only
account for three constraints: What will make the public happy? What
139
will remain under budget? Is this case worth my time?
Voters' lack of information creates an externality problem for
prosecutors' decisions on how to use their scarce resources. Prosecutors
need only consider their own private costs, but other relevant marginal
social costs of prosecution include public defense costs, incarceration
costs, and collateral consequences. Because voters lack data regarding
these costs, they cannot hold prosecutors accountable for them. These
costs thus remain external to prosecutors' cost-benefit decisions.

139. See Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1547 (explaining that prosecutors currently consider
"whether the probability of a successful prosecution is worth the time and resources that must be
invested in the case").
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Nonetheless, prosecutors can be forced to internalize these
externalities and thus make socially efficient rather than merely privately
efficient decisions. Once voters have cost information, they can
meaningfully assess whether their prosecutor's preferences match their
own and whether their prosecutor is spending their money wisely.
Voters can then hold prosecutors fully accountable. Because of the
increased accountability, prosecutors must anticipate voters' reactions to
this broader accounting of costs and add them to their cost-benefit
determinations. This proposal therefore addresses "[t]he current flaw in
the evolving power of the prosecutor[:] ...

the failure to force her to
4°

face the full cost of prosecutorial decisions.''
Prosecutorial resource allocation is socially efficient when
prosecutors bring a case only if all the benefits of incarcerating a
particular defendant for the likely sentence on a particular charge
outweigh all the costs. With mandatory disclosures, a prosecutor's initial
decisions of whether to charge an offender and for what crimes would
rest on whether the societal benefits of successful prosecution would
likely outweigh the costs of charging, prosecuting, and incarcerating the
offender on a particular charge or set of charges. This analysis must
account for the likelihood of recidivism and harm that a particular
offender is likely to cause if not incarcerated, as well as for the
potentially safer feeling that citizens experience when more criminals
are incarcerated.14 1 As cases progress, prosecutors should continue to
reweigh this calculus to determine whether to accept a plea bargain, take
a case to trial, or drop or modify pending charges. After obtaining a
conviction, prosecutors should consider the costs of incarceration against
its benefits when recommending a sentence. This process will help
allocate prosecutorial resources to reflect community preferences.
Mandatory cost disclosures would encourage prosecutors to follow this
process or risk losing their jobs.
With mandatory cost disclosures, prosecutors would have strong
incentives to use full cost accounting not only when deciding whom to
charge but also for what crimes and what sentences to recommend.
140. Misner, supranote 23, at 719.
141. This calculus is complicated by the cross-cutting pressure that overcrowded prisons
"perpetuate a criminogenic prison system that" threatens, rather than protects, public safety.
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *83-85 (E. &
N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), enforced, 2010 WL 99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), appeal docketed
sub noa. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and consideration ofjuris.
U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 3413 (2010); accord Pritikin, supra note 61, at 1058. In
postponed, _
Coleman, California officials conceded that prison overcrowding threatens public safety. 2009 WL
2430820, at *86.
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When criminal statutes overlap, as they often do, 142 prosecutors choose
between charging offenses that will likely lead to varying lengths of
incarceration. Because of mandatory minimum sentences and threestrikes laws in effect in many states, decisions on what charges to file
heavily influence the resulting sentence. 43 Thus, efficient resource
allocation in sentencing must begin at the charging stage. When a
prosecutor determines that charging a particular defendant would reap a
societal benefit at least as great as its cost, the prosecutor should
consider whether a particular charge would carry a mandatory minimum
or trigger a three-strikes law and thus raise the expected cost of
incarceration. Absent a mandatory minimum, prosecutors should
consider the costs of incarceration when recommending a sentence.144
A reader might understandably be concerned that prosecutors could
be unfairly held to account for expenses beyond their control such as
public defense or incarceration costs. It is certainly true that a prosecutor
cannot control how much time a public defender will spend on a given
case, how much money that public defender makes, how much prison
will cost, or (in any absolute sense) how long each particular defendant's
sentence will be, and thus cannot completely regulate the magnitude of
the expense. But even though prosecutors cannot precisely modulate
these expenses, they can control the binary decision of whether the
expenses occur at all. Prosecutors can decide not to charge a defendant
so that no public defense or prison costs are incurred. Or prosecutors can
charge a lesser offense than the maximum one that the evidence may
support, knowing that less public defense time and a shorter resulting
sentence will likely follow. Thus, while prosecutors cannot absolutely
control some of the expenses for which they will be held to account, they
do have some control over these expenses.

142. See supra Part II.A.

143. Simons, Punishment Theorists, supra note 103, at 324 (arguing that mandatory minimums
shift a great deal of power to prosecutors); Simons, Advisory Guidelines, supra note 103, at 384-85;
see also BUTLER, supra note 61, at 107 ("Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences

have reduced the discretion that judges used to have to fit the punishment to the crime. The
prosecutor can circumvent required sentences simply by charging a different crime, or leaving out
some of the evidence."). Three-strikes laws are no different for these purposes. This is particularly
true with "wobblers," crimes that can be charged as either felonies or misdemeanors. See Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 16 (2003). Only when charged as a felony do wobblers trigger a threestrikes penalty. Id. Thus, wobblers trigger a hefty mandatory sentence only when a prosecutor so
desires.
144. Missouri recently recognized the importance of considering cost at sentencing. Its
sentencing commission created a system that allows judges to see and consider the costs of various
sentencing options for a particular offender. Davey, supra note 47. Judge Michael Wolff of the

Supreme Court of Missouri explains that judges had been asking for such data. Id.
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With mandatory cost disclosures, prosecutors who ignore or poorly
estimate their constituents' preferences will likely be voted out of office
by informed voters. Moreover, once full cost information is placed in the
public eye, political preferences might change. Voters might decide that
certain types of cases are not worth their costs. As preferences change,
prosecutorial discretion allows enforcement decisions to shift quickly
with negligible cost. Prosecutorial resource allocation can move toward
a point where prosecutions are brought only when their marginal social
benefits equal or exceed their marginal social costs. 45 A rigidly
controlled regime governed only by prospective rulemaking could not
quickly adjust to match changes in voter preferences and would lead to
tremendous inefficiencies.
Concerns might arise that this proposal expects voters to monetize
their preferences for criminal law enforcement-a difficult task. Worse
still, even if each voter could appraise his or her preferences, there is no
market or other mechanism for prosecutors to aggregate their
constituencies' preferences. At best then, prosecutors might be forced to
play guessing games with their jobs as wagers. But the system of locally
elected prosecutors that our framers created accounts for these concerns.
Prosecutors are locally elected to act on behalf of and serve local
constituencies. 146 Prosecutors remain-as intended in colonial timesclose to their constituencies. 47 Some 2089 lead prosecutors serve
populations of fewer than 250,000 people. 148 More than 1000 lead
prosecutors serve populations of 36,500 people or fewer. 149 With
constituencies of these sizes, it is far easier to accept the notion that
prosecutors could effectively approximate the preferences of their local
constituencies and implement those preferences in their decision-making
processes.
Locally electing prosecutors also preserves the heterogeneity of
American communities and allows for different locally efficient
allocations to match varied preferences. As an example, consider that out
of every 100,000 residents, Minnesota imprisons only 300 and Maine
145. Lynch, supra note 97, at 2139 ("Discretion in enforcement permits rapid adjustment of
priorities as the extent and perceived obnoxiousness of such offenses wax and wane.").
146. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 38 (1980)
(describing prosecutors' role as "local representation applying local standards to the enforcement of
essentially local laws").
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. Judith N. Phelan & Michael D. Schrunk, The Future of Local Prosecution in America, in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 248 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine NugentBorakove eds., 2008).
149. Id.
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273,150 while Texas imprisons 1000 and Louisiana 1138.151 "[I]t is
almost guaranteed that prosecutors who are elected in highly rural
counties will have quite different constituencies and will face very
different criminal problems from those prosecutors elected in heavily
urban counties. 152 For instance, rural prosecutors
may be more likely to
53
seek the death penalty than urban prosecutors.1
Mandatory cost disclosures would help to overcome the greatest
obstacle to efficient allocation of prosecutorial resources-the public's
lack of information.' 54 Efficiency requires the flow of information.'5 5
Only when well informed can people be expected to make decisions
that
56
benefits.1
marginal
and
costs
marginal
their
track
accurately
150. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at
Al.
151. Id.
152. Pizzi, supra note 30, at 1344; cf Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and
Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 100-02 (2005) (recognizing
geographic variation in federal sentencing).
153. Heather Ratcliffe, Crime's Locale May Sway Decision to Seek Death Penalty, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 6, 2008, at Al. A detailed empirical study confirmed the disparity of death
sentences in rural versus urban Missouri. Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An
Empirical Study of ProsecutorialDecision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ.L. REV. 305,
307 (2009) ("[T]here are large disparities in the decision-making process and in outcomes
depending on the place of the prosecution.... [D]efendants in Missouri's two largest cities-St.
Louis and Kansas City-are less likely to face capital trials and less likely to be sentenced to death
than defendants in the rest of the state."). That result derives from the fact that "prosecutors in St.
Louis City and Jackson County [which encompasses Kansas City] filed capital charges much less
frequently than prosecutors in the rest of the state." Id. at 344.
A reader might wonder whether the fact that urban prosecutors seek the death penalty less often
than rural prosecutors indicates that prosecutors already attempt to satisfy their constituents'
preferences. That is probably true. Yet prospects for actually adhering to voter preferences on a
large scale would improve if those constituencies were well informed regarding the costs of
prosecution and the relative priorities that information demonstrated.
154. See supra Part IB; see also Bibas, supra note I1, at 983 ("Though in theory prosecutors
serve the public interest, the public cannot monitor whether they are in fact serving the public well.
Voter turnout is low, especially in local elections. Members of the public have sparse and unreliable
information about how well prosecutors perform. Most public information about criminal justice
comes from crime dramas or novels, reality television shows, or sensational, unrepresentative news
stories. As a result, the public suffers from chronic misperceptions about how the criminal justice
system actually works. The public also has very little power to influence criminal justice." (citations
omitted)).
155. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 368 (1995) ("The presence of
privately held (or asymmetrically held) information can confound both centralized (e.g., quotas and
taxes) and decentralized (e.g., bargaining) attempts to achieve optimality." (emphasis in original));
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 466-69 (3d ed. 1992).
156. Allowing a perfectly competitive market to reach equilibrium is presumably why simple
economic models assume perfect information. MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 155, at 716 ("Up to
now we have concentrated the analysis on a model where spot trading for goods occurs under
conditions of perfect information about the state of the world. In this section, we relax this feature
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Contrasting a high-profile case with more typical prosecutions
demonstrates the difference that information makes. Voters learn about
expenditures in high-profile cases through the news media, 57 but they
learn little or nothing about the routine cases.158 In a current prosecutor
election campaign, a challenger can only point to an exceptional case
costing millions of dollars as an example of wasteful spending. But
fueled with mandatory cost disclosure information, challengers could
confront incumbent prosecutors about these more routine decisions by
synthesizing the relevant data for voters. Challengers can mount such
offensives only if they have these data.15 9 Mandatory cost disclosures
thus exponentially increase the number of arrows in a challenger's
quiver and help close the information
gap between the run-of-the-mill
60
cases and the high-profile ones.'
Voters check only lead prosecutors directly at the ballot box, and thus
only lead prosecutors have a direct incentive to appease voters. But the
chain of command within each prosecutor's office will ensure that line
prosecutors too are concerned with voter preferences. 161 Line
prosecutors are responsible to the lead prosecutor and could face

by considering the possibility that this information is not perfect. In doing so, we shall see that there
is a key difference between the case of symmetric information (all traders have the same
information), which is largely reducible to the previous theory, and the case of asymmetric
information, where a host of new and difficult conceptual problems arise." (emphasis in original)).
157. See Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1526-27. Vorenberg seems correct that in high-profile
cases prosecutors' discretion is already checked to a certain extent by their electorates. See id.
158. See Wright, supra note 9, at 602 ("The candidates talk a great deal about last year's
notorious case.... [But] an outcome in one big case tells us little about the quality of prosecution
work more generally."); see also Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1526-27 ("Prosecutors exercise the
least discretion over those crimes that most frighten, outrage, or intrigue the public, such as murder,
rape, arson, armed robbery, kidnapping, and large-scale trafficking in hard drugs, particularly when
the circumstances make the crime unusually heinous. Since visibility focuses greater scrutiny on the
prosecutor, only a prosecutor whose political position is unusually secure can disappoint
expectations that are part of the climate in which he works. Of course, what is seen as outrageous
varies with time and place.").
159. Lack of usable information seems to account for the two failures of prosecutor elections.
"First, they do not often force an incumbent to give any public explanation at all for the priorities
and practices of the office. Second, even when incumbents do face challenges, the candidates talk
more about particular past cases than about the larger patterns and values reflected in local criminal
justice." Wright, supra note 9, at 583.
160. This attempt to force information into voters' hands scores with Wright's suggestion that
better informed voters would make better choices. Id. at 606.
161. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 143 ("Possibly the most important check of discretionary action
is simply the normal supervision of subordinates by superiors."); Stuntz, supra note 21, at 535
("District attorneys are likely to seek to manage their offices in ways that win them public support.
To some degree, line prosecutors will seek to do that too, because that is their bosses' goal, and they
must satisfy their bosses in order to keep their jobs.").
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consequences in either of two ways if they slight efficiency. First, to
save their own jobs, lead prosecutors might fire line prosecutors.
Second, a lead prosecutor might be voted out of office and the new lead
prosecutor might not retain the line prosecutor.
Mandatory cost disclosures would empower voters to make informed
decisions in prosecutor elections. Knowing that voters would be armed
with such information, prosecutors would internalize what were
previously external costs by assessing their decisions in light of the
broad swath of costs and benefits at all stages of a prosecution,
beginning with the charging decision. Such calculated considerations
will achieve a more socially efficient allocation of prosecutorial
resources.
2.

Sovereignty

In addition to increasing efficiency, mandatory cost disclosures allow
elected prosecutors to remain true to their democratic origins.
The key check on prosecutorial discretion is the public, the
constituency the prosecutor serves. As an elected officer of the
state, the prosecutor must answer to the public. If the
constituency of the jurisdiction is not satisfied with the
performance of the elected prosecutor, then there is an
opportunity, depending on the electoral cycle of the jurisdiction,
to make changes ....

But it is the public nature of the office,

where the prosecutor's track record is available for all to see,
that serves as the ultimate check on prosecutorial discretion.
A prosecutor's credibility is dependent upon the transparency
of the office and his or her effectiveness as a case processor.162
Prosecutorial discretion is not inherently inconsistent with democratic
sovereignty. Rather, prosecutorial discretion stares down the barrel of
autocracy only when voters lack information about its use. Prosecutorial
discretion need not destroy democratic accountability by blocking
voters' access to information on the decisions that prosecutors make on
162. Phelan & Schrunk, supra note 148, at 250-51. Related to the effective democratic check on
the prosecutor is the notion that "prisons [are] a rough reflection of the societies that create and
maintain them-that is, that nations get the prison systems they want or deserve." Craig Haney,
Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners,43 U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 90 (2008). Winston Churchill

similarly observed that the "mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country." WINIFRED A. ELKIN,
THE ENGLISH PENAL SYSTEM 277 (1957) (quoting a Winston Churchill speech before the House of
Commons). In Coppedge v. United States, the Court explained that "[tlhe methods we employ in the
enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our
civilization may be judged." 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
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the people's behalf.163 Yet democratic checks cannot function effectively
absent a well-informed populace. 164 This proposal would force the
relevant information into the public domain.
The public needs information to improve governance, and the people
have a right to this knowledge in our democracy.' 65 Otherwise, voters
make arbitrary decisions based on minimal
information that cannot be
66
said to reflect their actual preferences. 1
This argument that an effective democratic check on prosecutorial
discretion can be achieved admittedly assumes that voters will actually
vote prosecutors out of office if they wield their power ineffectively or
inefficiently. Justice Blackmun expressed his faith in that check, and
1 67
several commentators have expressed similar sentiments.
163. See Vorenberg, supranote 16, at 1559 ("The results are disheartening for one who believes
that the legislature and the public should have sufficient information to improve the way
government works. Prosecutorial discretion precludes access to such information. For example, a
prosecutor may have an unannounced practice of holding in abeyance charges for most first-offense
larceny cases against youthful offenders, while being very tough on sales of even small amounts of
drugs. Typically there is no way of testing the effects of reversing the practice, or of determining
whether this approach reflects the public's wishes. The fact that prosecutors or their appointing
authorities must seek election is small comfort in view of the low visibility with which they exercise
their discretion.").
164. "[A]n informed public is the essence of working democracy." Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983). This was the same principle animating
Judge Learned Hand's democratic wager-"democracy is best protected by a principle that forbids
government to limit or control political speech in any way for the purpose of protecting
democracy." DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 353. Ronald Dworkin's "sophisticated version of the
majoritarian conception" of democracy echoes the notion that democracy requires an informed
populace, "insist[ing] that the majority's opinion does not count as its will unless citizens have had
an adequate opportunity to become informed and to deliberate about the issues." Id. at 357.
Layered on top of this concern about the functioning of a democratic check absent information is
that "[t]he nature of the democratic process may not lend itself to meaningful policy dialogue
between those in power and the populace." Fairfax, supra note 41, at 742; accord SPENCER
OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 43-64 (2006).
Such a lack of dialogue presents difficulties in preservation of popular sovereignty, a notion deeply
entwined with democracy. See DWORKIN, supranote 6, at 365.
165. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (plurality
opinion); id.at 592-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269-70 (1964); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 75, 150-54 (1980).
166. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 357.
167. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
healthful to keep charging practices visible to the general public, so that political bodies can judge
whether the policy being followed is a fair one."); see also Misner, supra note 23, at 763
(prosecutors who use their resources inefficiently will be voted out of office); Weinstein, supra note
102, at 103 n.69 (prosecutors who abuse their power or use it ineffectively will be voted out). Fred
Zacharias advocated using the political check to rein in prosecutorial misconduct, but his trust in the
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Greater information about how prosecutorial resources are spent
would also mitigate the problem of whom voters should blame for
mistakes in the criminal justice system. It may presently be difficult for
voters to scrutinize the actions of any one responsible individual.1 68 With
cost disclosures, voters will be better positioned to focus criticisms or
praise on the lead prosecutor who bears ultimate authority over who is
prosecuted and for what charges.
"Because [lead] prosecutors are virtually always elected officials, the
extent to which they are accountable to the public is an essential
component of democratic governance."' 169 Mandatory disclosures would
push allocation of prosecutorial resources toward greater efficiency and
restore democratic sovereignty over the exercise of sovereign
prosecutorial power.
C.

EnvisioningPracticalResults

What might a more efficient and democratic allocation of
prosecutorial resources look like in practice? One likely possibility is
70
fewer prosecutions, particularly of nonviolent victimless crimes.
Although some might be skeptical about whether greater information
effectiveness of the check applies equally in the broader context of checking all exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 721, 765 (2001).
168. Misner, supra note 23, at 717 ("In theory, the electorate holds decision-makers responsible
for their actions. However, because of the current diffusion of responsibility, the electorate cannot
easily scrutinize the actions of any one official or hold that official independently accountable for
the successes or failures of the entire system. In fact, no one is currently held accountable for the
successes or failures of the criminal justice system."). This concern echoes in part Justice Scalia's
concern that the independent counsel was not accountable to the public. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Gordon & Huber, supra note 36, at 349-50.
170. BUTLER, supra note 61, at 4 ("In the United States, the rush to punish is out of control. In
addition to the violent creeps I put away, I sent hundreds of other people to prison who should not
be there."). Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Wolff explained recently that "sentencing costs would
never be a consideration in the most violent cases, just in circumstances where prison is not the only
obvious answer." Davey, supra note 47.
The three-judge panel decision in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger bears on this prediction insofar as
it relies on evidence that "conclusively showed that public safety would not be adversely affected by
releasing low-risk, nonserious, nonviolent offenders from the prison system without placing them
on parole supervision." Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *103 (E. & N.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), enforced, 2010 WL 99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), appeal docketed sub
nom. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and consideration ofjuris.
postponed, _
U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 3413 (2010). That supervising these offenders would not
contribute to public safety also indicates that the benefit of prosecuting and incarcerating such
offenders is not terribly high. Moreover, these crimes were not included on Vorenberg's list of highprofile crimes likely to stir up public interest. Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1526-27.
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would actually push voters to demand fewer prosecutions, the recent
recession may drive voters to reconsider their fiscal priorities and turn
away from incarceration.' 71 Perhaps this reevaluation of priorities would
mean diversion or alternative programs in place of incarceration for
minor offenses.
Before considering how the allocation of prosecutorial resources
might change under this proposal, it is important to examine the status
quo. The United States has a higher incarceration rate than any other
country in the industrialized world. 172 Americans are locked up for
crimes that would rarely produce prison sentences in other countries. 173
"Excluding children and the elderly, nearly one in fifty people wakes up
behind bars each morning."'174 One in thirty-one adults is either
incarcerated, on probation, or on parole.' 75 Over the past thirty years, the
prison population has risen 500%.176 In the last fifty years it has
77
increased nearly 700%.1
Perhaps the American political climate differs
dramatically from those of other countries and we genuinely value these
high rates of incarceration,
but given the massive costs of these choices,
78
we should be sure.
171. Missouri's sentencing commission recently concluded that costs of sentences are a relevant
factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence. See Davey, supra note 47.
172. Gershowitz, supra note 16, at 52 ("The United States incarcerates more offenders per capita
than any industrialized nation in the world: three times more than Israel, five times more than
England, six times more than Australia and Canada, eight times more than France, and over twelve
times more than Japan.").
173. Liptak, supra note 150; Rough Justice, supra note 61 ("No other rich country is nearly as
punitive as the Land of the Free.").
174. Gershowitz, supranote 16, at 52.
175. Sullivan, supra note 98.
176. Gershowitz, supranote 16, at 47.
177. Steiker, supra note 15. The incarceration rate remained steady from the mid-1920s through
the mid-1970s, a period encompassing "the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression, the run up to
World War II, World War II itself, its aftermath, the Korean War, the civil rights movement, the
tumultuous 1960s, and the Vietnam War." Haney, supra note 162, at 102. "But in the mid-1970s
everything began to change. Thus, after a half century of near-perfect stability, the rate of
incarceration began its unprecedented and unremitting climb. Over the next twenty-five years alone,
from the mid-1970s until 2000, a previously stable rate increased more than fivefold." Id.
178. Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners,supra note 61, at 26 ("Justice is harsher in America
than in any other rich country."). Craig Haney has identified what he terms a "War on Prisoners."
Haney, supra note 162, at 89. He contends that "we declared this War on Prisoners as a matter of
political choice or preference, not necessity." Id. at 102. Moreover, "governmental spending
priorities shifted to accommodate the new prison realities." Id. at 105. Yet, one cannot help but
wonder whether, given the lack of effective political check, this is indeed our societal choice or
merely a political choice meant to avoid the potential costs of appearing soft on crime. See Beale,
supra note 56, at 29 ("The epithet 'soft on crime' is the contemporary equivalent of 'soft on
Communism."').
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Some crime-control advocates might see these incarceration statistics
as glowing achievements and would think it dangerous to reduce
prosecutions and convictions. Local communities may want to keep this
status quo or may even want more prosecutions. In either case,
mandatory cost disclosures would legitimize these local preferences as
democratically desired and would serve the interests of those seeking
more prosecution even in the face of substantial criticism of overprosecution in America.1 79 But if having fewer prosecutions better
reflects the desires of a local community, then fewer prosecutions would
likewise be a democratic improvement. In the end, "[h]eeding this
community conception of justice is crucial to maintain the criminal law's
compliance, efficacy, and legitimacy in the public's eyes."' 8 °
If voters actually knew the costs of all prosecutions undertaken in
their name and the subsequent incarceration costs, some of the practices
making America the world's great prison warden would probably wane.
Do Phoenix voters genuinely wish to spend $11 million every year on a
nine-block area of the South Mountain neighborhood?1 8' Evidence on
voter crime-control preferences under the counterfactual scenario of
greater information is admittedly scarce, but the South Mountain statistic
might give even Maricopa County voters pause.
Some readers might be skeptical that understanding the costs of
prosecution would affect voters' preferences given the tough-on-crime
stance of many politicians. But there are two reasons to think that voters
would desire less criminal law enforcement if aware of its actual costs.
First, the gut-level desire for ever-greater levels of criminal law
82
enforcement may actually make people less safe rather than more.
"What the War on Drugs means is that we've taken nonviolent
179. E.g., BUTLER, supra note 61, at 4; Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners,supra note 61, at
26; Rough Justice, supranote 61, at 13.
180. Bibas, supranote 11, at 982.
181. Gary Fields, Hidden Costs: Communities Pay Price of High Prison Rate-Phoenix
Neighborhood'sMissing Men, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at Al.
182. See BUTLER, supra note 61, at 19 ("There is a tipping point at which crime increases if too
many people are incarcerated. The United States is past this point. If we lock up fewer people, we
will be safer."); id. at 3 1 ("[H]igher rates of incarceration were not a deterrent and may in fact have
produced more criminals."); Pritikin, supra note 61, at 1091 ("[A]ny further increases in
incarceration beyond [2008] levels would actually create more crime than they would prevent.");
see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *8385 (E. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (overcrowded prisons threaten rather than protect public safety),
enforced, 2010 WL 99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010),appeal docketed sub nom.
Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and consideration ofjuris postponed,
__ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 3413 (2010); Beale, supra note 56, at 31 (arguing that harsher enforcement
continues even in the face of evidence that harsher sentences do not produce additional deterrence).
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offenders, exposed them to violent ones, and then reintroduced them to
our communities.' ' 3 Although this mandatory cost disclosure proposal
will not bring this criminological effect of incarceration to the fore, as
more literature emerges on this topicMs4 more voters may begin to
question whether their tax dollars are being wisely spent if they are less
safe as a result.
Second, the "great recession" has unearthed interest in saving money
by incarcerating fewer people. The district attorney for Contra Costa
County, California announced that many misdemeanors and some felony
drug crimes involving only small quantities of drugs will not be
prosecuted.185 In Richmond, Virginia, the commonwealth's attorney
indicated that he is considering not prosecuting many misdemeanor and
traffic offenses. 186 Atlanta attempted to save money by cutting jobs in
the public defender's office, but a one-sided cutback could require fewer
prosecutions to not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 187 Perhaps for that reason, Atlanta also cut resources devoted to
prosecution by furloughing employees in its district attorneys' offices
one day each month. 88 Furloughs of district attorneys have not been
limited to Atlanta. 189 Cutting back on prosecution resources potentially
183. BUTLER, supra note 61, at 46. "Department of Corrections data show that about a fourth of
those initially imprisoned for nonviolent crimes are sentenced for a second time for committing a
violent offense. Whatever else it reflects, this pattern highlights the possibility that prison serves to
transmit violent habits and values rather than to reduce them." Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The
Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Experiment, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 720 (1998); accordPritikin, supra note 61, at 1054-55.
184. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 61.
185. Henry K. Lee, Many Contra Costa Crooks Won't Be Prosecuted, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22,
2009, at B1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-22/bay-area/17194086 lprosecutedeputy-district-contra-costa-county. Crimes not prosecuted will include assaults, thefts, and
burglaries. Contra Costa County may continue to prosecute some misdemeanors such as domestic
violence, driving under the influence, firearms offenses, vehicular manslaughter, sex crimes and
assault with a deadly weapon. Id Similar decisions have been made in Ventura County, California,
where prosecutors are treating possession of small amounts of marijuana and a handful of other
misdemeanors as infractions subject only to a monetary fine. Theresa Rochester, Misdemeanors
Becoming Infractions Under New County Guidelines, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.vcstar.com/news/2009/mar/l 7/misdemeanors-becoming-infractions-under-new/.
186. Wesley P. Hester, Chesterfield Prosecutor Says He Needs Additional Funds, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 24, 2009, at BI, available at http://www2.timesdispatch.com
news/2009/mar/24/pros2420090323-223024-ar-48533/.
187. Lynda Edwards, Justice Systems Sent Reeling, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2009, at 60, 61.
188. Id. at 61.
189. See, e.g., Malaika Fraley, Overwhelmed Contra Costa Prosecutors Pained by Looming
Furloughs, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.contracostatimes.com/
news/ci_16836846; Press Release, Elizabeth A. Egan, Fresno County District Attorney, Statement
by the District Attorney to the Fresno County Board of Supervisors (June 22, 2010),
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leads to fewer new prisoners incarcerated. Government officials who
made these cuts must have considered that possibility and yet opted to
make the cuts nonetheless. Even the Republican former governor of
California recently criticized his state for spending too much on
90
incarceration and too little on education.'
Voters might be less tolerant of expenditures on small-time victimless
crimes if they understood the costs of prosecution, defense, and
incarceration.1 91 Even without a surge of voter support, some states have
recently reduced budgetary strain from the penal system. Some states
have extended good-time programs to allow for earlier release of certain
offenders. 192 State legislatures in South Carolina and Utah have
considered early release for thousands of inmates. 193
Several states have eliminated or reduced mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses. 194 Maine decriminalized possession of up to
2.5 ounces of marijuana, leaving a monetary fine as the only possible
punishment. 195 Some of these reform measures have arisen in politically
conservative states. Perhaps early release has gained traction even in
these states because half of the people imprisoned in America have
committed nonviolent crimes.1 96 Perhaps it is because the fifty states
http://www.co.fresno.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Departrnents/DistrictAttomey/06221 0 - DA Egan
Speaks to BOS About Budget Cuts.pdf (speaking out against how budget cuts have forced the
Fresno DA to reduce the size of her office); Becky Purser, DistrictAttorney's Office Not Immune
from Furloughs, MACON.COM, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.macon.com/2009/03/30/666154/districtattorneys-office-not.html#.
190. Schwarzenegger, supranote 7.
191. A recent article contends that voters' support for tougher sentencing relies on voters' lack of
awareness of costs. 2007 CaliforniaCriminal Legislation: Meaningful Change, or Preserving the
Status Quo, 13 BERKELEY J. CRiM. L. 97, 110-11 (2008). Fully informed voters might think
differently.
192. Act of July 1, 2009, Act No. 266, 2009 La. Acts 2287; Act of Mar. 3, 2009, ch. 316, 2009
Miss. Legis. Serv. 58; Act of June 19, 2009, ch. 1251, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3979.
193. Sullivan, supra note 98. California was judicially ordered to release inmates. Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *83-85 (E. & N.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 2009) (overcrowded prisons threaten rather than protect public safety), enforced, 2010 WL
99000 (E. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), appealdocketed sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 091323 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2010), and consideration ofjuris postponed, _ U.S. _,
130 S.Ct. 3413
(2010). The California legislature has complied. Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 28, 2009 Cal. Stat. 4392.
194. Act of May 15, 2009, ch. 83, 2009 Minn. Laws 1024 (creating safety-valve from mandatory
minimums); Act of Apr. 7, 2009, ch. 56, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 128 (McKinney) (allowing for
shorter sentences on drug crimes and expanding availability of substance abuse treatment programs
to additional offenders); Act of Nov. 13, 2009, ch. 346, 2009-4 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv.
742 (LexisNexis) (eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for drug possession charges).
195. Act of Sept. 12, 2009, ch. 67, 2009 Me. Laws 138.
196. Gershowitz, supra note 16, at 52 (citing MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006)).
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spent a combined $49 billion on corrections in 2008, an increase from
less than $1 1 billion twenty years earlier. 197 Maybe these expenditures
are not worth the money to people from across the political spectrum.
Based on these recent legislative actions, fully informed voters would
the current levels of spending on prosecution and
probably not condone
198
incarceration.
If fully informed voters began to show intolerance toward these
massive prosecutorial and penal expenditures, the first push to lessen
prosecution would likely target small quantity drug possession
offenses. 199 Recent legislation supports that prediction. Kentucky passed
a law diverting hundreds of drug offenders away from prisons and into
treatment programs.200 Similar programs are emerging in Kansas,
Montana, and Pennsylvania. 20 ' Given this recent legislation and debates
202
about the costs of incarceration, many state legislators now seem to
think that voters would rather spend less money incarcerating drug
offenders.
Yet voters are hardly going to wish for, or even tolerate, the nonprosecution of murders or violent crimes with identifiable victims,
despite the costs of these prosecutions. As one article explained it,
"When a habitual rapist is locked up, the streets are safer. But the same
is not necessarily true of petty drug-dealers .... ,2 03 Because they seem
to present the least societal harm, small quantity drug possession cases
197. Simpson, supra note 3.
198. Butler argues that massive incarceration expenditures are one reason why voters should care
about the frequency with which we imprison people. BUTLER, supra note 61, at 34 (implying that
voters care about the costs and opportunity costs of criminal law enforcement spending).
199. Attempting to predict which crimes would be less often prosecuted relies on the notion that
"[tihere is indeed core agreement on ranking which offenders deserve the most punishment." Bibas,
supranote 11, at 982. Admittedly, this is less than an exact science.
Nonetheless, this prediction relies on the dramatic increase in incarceration of drug offenders
over the past 30 years. "The number of people in jail and prison for drug violations increased from
50,000 in 1980 to almost 500,000 today." Robert G. Lawson, Drug Law Reform-Retreating From
an Incarceration Addiction, 98 KY. L.J. 201, 201 (2010) (quoting Ethan A. Nadelmann,
Criminologistsand Punitive Drug Prohibition:To Serve or to Challenge?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 441, 442 (2004)). "[D]rug offenders constituted 20% of state prison inmates in 2006 and
52% of federal prison inmates in 2008." THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND
PRISONERS (2010), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/
inc_factsAboutPrisonsDec20lO.pdf.
200. Sullivan, supra note 98; Act of Mar. 24, 2009, ch. 96, 2009 Ky. Acts 1072, 1072
("WHEREAS, over 80 percent of the persons involved in the Kentucky Criminal Justice System are
there as a result, either directly, or indirectly of drug abuse.").
201. Sullivan, supra note 98.
202. Id.
203. Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners,supra note 61, at 26.
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provide the most likely target for decreased prosecution. Such small
quantity drug possession offenders represent a substantial number of
those currently incarcerated.2 °4
Allocating prosecutorial resources away from small-time drug
offenders could also reduce racial disparity in the criminal justice
system. Because drug crime incarceration more disproportionately
impacts African-Americans than does incarceration for other crimes,2°5
prosecuting fewer drug crimes could lessen this disparity. In some
neighborhoods, like Phoenix's South Mountain, fewer prosecutions of
small-scale drug offenders could mean significant changes. Almost an
entire generation of men from this nine-block residential area is
incarcerated, costing nearly $11 million per year. 206 As one
neighborhood activist said, "It's sad but we have men who are over 35
and we have young people under 17.... The ones in between are
2 °7
missing.
Fewer drug related prosecutions, convictions, and incarcerations
could also result in more parents free to raise their children. "There is
little evidence that we are winning the war on drugs this way but a great
deal of evidence that we are destroying the lives of thousands of
people., 20 8 A staggering number of children-il.7 million-had a parent

204. At the end of 2006 (the year of the most recent statistics available from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics), drug offenders comprised approximately 20% of state prison inmates. WILLIAM J. SABOL
ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 37 (2009),

availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. In New York, in 2005, drug offenders
represented 35.7% of the prison population. Weissman, supra note 2, at 249.
205. See SABOL ET AL., supra note 204, at 37 (stating that African-Americans comprise 44.2% of
state prison inmates incarcerated on drug charges but only 36.7% of state prison population
incarcerated on other charges as of year-end 2006).
206. Fields, supra note 181.
207. Id.
208. Weinstein, supra note 102, at 98. A recent article aptly recognized the tremendous nonmonetary costs of what the author calls the "War on Prisoners," including the indirect costs on
inmates' dependents. Haney, supra note 162, at 88-90. The author expounds on these very human
costs:
The sheer number of people who have been touched by the experience of imprisonment is
enormous. They are the direct and collateral casualties of the War on Prisoners that we have
waged. For example, there are over one million people who come out of our prisons and jails
each year, as a slightly larger number enters them....
In addition to the enormous number of people who go in and out of our prisons each year,
and the unprecedented number that languish for long sentences inside, there are numerous
relatives and loved ones-including many children-who are directly impacted by their
incarceration. They, too, struggle with the financial, familial, and interpersonal instability
brought about by the incarceration of persons close to them. Personal, social, and economic
resources are stretched thin as families, government agencies, and community organizations
struggle to fill the void created by incarceration and to absorb the consequences of prisoners'
eventual transition back into the neighborhoods where they once lived.
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in prison as of July 1, 2007.209 That number represents a 79% increase
from 1991 to 2007.210 Moreover, drug offenders (particularly men) more
frequently have children than most other offenders.21' Children of
incarcerated parents suffer tremendous difficulties.2 12 These hidden costs
of prosecution cannot be adequately monetized by a market, but they
213
For these
nonetheless merit voter and prosecutor consideration.
reasons, mandatory disclosures could return parents to their children's
lives.
Fewer prosecutions of small-scale drug offenders need not mean drug
amnesties. Rather, alternative sentences might strike a better cost-benefit
balance.21 4 One alternative method is that adopted by Hawaii Judge
Steven Alm. Instead of long delays after a probation violation, Judge
Alm revokes probation and locks up violators immediately for a shorter
2 16
fewer violations.
time. 2 11 Immediate incarceration has led to 80%

Id. at 89-90. More direct consequences attach to the inmates. Id. at 107 ("[M]ost prisoners cannot
leave the psychic scars of these experiences miraculously behind them upon release, just as most
people cannot simply chose [sic] to set aside the aftereffects of damaging, traumatic events."); Id. at
111 ("The stress of prison overcrowding likely interacts with and amplifies the pre-existing
problems that prisoners may bring into the prison setting. For example, we know the risk factors and
various forms of trauma that predispose persons to a range of psychological problems (including
substance abuse, criminality, and violence), are prevalent in the pre-prison lives of incarcerated men
and women.").
209. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2008), available

at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf; Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S Dep't of Justice (Aug. 26, 2008). These are the most recent statistics available from the Bureau
of Justice Statistics.
210. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supranote 209, at 1.
211. Id. at 4 ("Among male state prisoners, violent (47%) and property (48%) offenders were less
likely to report having children than public-order (60%) and drug (59%) offenders. . .. For women
held in state prison, violent (57%) offenders were less likely than drug (63%), property (65%), and
public-order (65%) offenders to be a mother.").
212. Attorney General Eric Holder, in a 2009 speech, discussed some of these difficulties. Eric
Holder, Att'y Gen., Attorney General Eric Holder at the Fatherhood Town Hall (Dec. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091215.html ("And we know that
children of incarcerated parents suffer from: the physical and emotional separation; the stigma
associated with having a parent detained; the loss of financial support; and the disruption caused by
introducing new caregivers into a child's life, no matter how well meaning those caregivers may be.
As a result, children of incarcerated parents often struggle with anxiety, depression, learning
problems, and aggression, undermining their own chances of future success.").
213. Haney's recent article explained the long-term consequences that children of prisoners face.
Haney, supra note 162, at 124.
214. See Brown, supra note 16, at 326. Missouri judges are now able to attempt to strike a better
cost-benefit balance at sentencing because they now have available information comparing the costs
of various sentencing options for a particular defender. Davey, supra note 47.
215. Sullivan, supra note 98.
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Immediacy of consequences bolsters effectiveness, and the program
saves money because of the shorter incarceration. 1 7 It provides a clear
efficiency improvement by decreasing marginal cost and increasing
marginal benefit. 218 But without a well-informed populace, there are no
political pressures for genuine social efficiency, and thus our justice
system may not move toward a more efficient allocation of resources.
Other alternatives to incarceration include drug courts or diversion
programs focused on monitoring and treatment rather than long-term
incarceration. 2 19 One such program is the DIVERT Court in Dallas,
Texas, where first-time offenders accept greater monitoring in a
rehabilitative program in exchange for avoiding a conviction. 220
Statistical evidence shows the efficiency improvements of DIVERT
Court over traditional incarceration. Recidivism is 68% lower than in the

216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. The Center for Court Innovation estimates that there are 2500 problem-solving courts in the
U.S. Eileen Libby, Watch What You Ask For, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2009, at 24. Similar programs have
gained popularity in Taiwan recently, where prosecutors can defer prosecution conditioned on
compliance with certain obligations. Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan's New Adversarial System and the
Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 651, 676 (2009). This
Taiwanese practice, placing the deferred prosecution decision in the hands of the prosecutor rather
than a judge, was modeled after a similar Japanese practice and is used in approximately 13% of
cases. Id. at 676-78.
A Canadian study concluded:
[P]lacing low-risk offenders in often overcrowded high-security facilities resulted in high rates
of reincarceration. The rates were significantly higher than those of comparable low-risk
offenders who had been placed in halfway houses. The researchers concluded that the failure to
properly divert low-risk offenders from high- to low-security facilities-something that
overcrowded prison systems often lack the capacity to do--"may actually increase the risk of
future recidivism."
Haney, supra note 162, at 120 (quoting James Bonta & Laurence L. Motiuk, The Diversion of
IncarceratedOffenders to CorrectionalHalfivay Houses, 24 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 302, 311-12
(1987)). In addition to the psychological consequences, increased recidivism also results from
medical conditions developed during incarceration in an overcrowded penal system and negative
employment consequences resulting from long-term removal from the workforce and the stigma of
conviction. Id. at 119, 122. If our incarceration choices cause more crime, see BUTLER, supra note
61, at 46; Pritikin, supra note 61, at 1091, then broad reconsideration of the cost-benefit analysis
underlying these choices is necessary.
Bibas considers the flourishing of such alternative programs as "reflecting the public's
willingness to soften enforcement." Bibas, supra note 11, at 990. That may be true, but they also
evidence a public concerned about effective law enforcement.
220. DIVERT stands for Dallas Initiative for Diversion and Expedited Rehabilitation and
Treatment. Wade Goodwyn, Texas Court Aims to 'Divert' First-Time Offenders, National Public
Radio
(Aug.
15,
2008),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=93614135.
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traditional Texas criminal courts. 221 Every dollar spent in DIVERT
22
Court saves nine dollars in future costs. 2 Moreover, without such
programs, Texas correctional facilities would be bursting even further at
the seams. There were 157,000 inmates in Texas prisons in August
2008.223 Without changes to the level of incarceration, 17,000 more beds
2 24
will be necessary in the next year and a half. With wider adoption of
alternative programs like DIVERT Court nationally, significant
improvements in both costs and benefits of criminal law enforcement are
possible, alleviating long-term financial strain on states. DIVERT Court
is one of eighty problem-solving courts in Texas. If these programs can
find support in the law-and-order state of Texas, it is hard to imagine
that the American crime-control ethos might hinder wider adoption of
such programs elsewhere.
Drug courts follow a similar model to Texas's DIVERT Court but
focus on drug offenses. 225 These drug courts provide a more effective
226
Graduates of
alternative to the traditional venue for the war on drugs.
have a
Virginia
in
court
drug
Heights
Chesterfield/Colonial
the
not in
offenders
situated
recidivism rate six times lower than similarly
227
Similar results would likely hold true across
the drug court program.
the country if criminal law enforcement shifted more toward monitoring
and rehabilitation for less serious offenses. Even for those students who

221. Id. Perhaps this recidivism rate is lower partly because DIVERT Court participants are firsttime offenders, but that fact does not seem to account for the entire disparity. Rather, there is good
reason to think that imprisoning nonviolent offenders increases recidivism. See BUTLER, supra note
61, at 46 ("What the War on Drugs means is that we've taken nonviolent offenders, exposed them to
violent ones, and then reintroduced them to our communities. ... [P]rison serves to transmit violent
habits and values rather than to reduce them."); Pritikin, supra note 61, at 1054-55.
A study by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency showed that participants in alternatives
to incarceration programs "were significantly less likely to be rearrested than people who received
jail sentences." Weissman, supra note 2, at 243 (2009). Only 41% of alternative program
participants were "rearrested, compared to fifty-three percent of people released from jail." Id.
222. Goodwyn, supranote 220.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. A drug court is a "special court given responsibility to handle cases involving drug-addicted
offenders through extensive supervision and treatment programs.... Rather than focusing only on
the crimes drug offenders commit and the punishments they receive, drug courts attempt to address
and solve the underlying causes of addiction." Frederick G. Rockwell III, The Chesterfield/Colonial
Heights Drug Court: A PartnershipBetween the Criminal Justice System and the Treatment
Community, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 5, 7-8 (2008).
226. Several studies have concluded that participating in drug courts reduces recidivism. See id.
at 16.
227. Id.
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participate in but do not graduate from the Chesterfield/Colonial Heights
228
program, the rate of subsequent conviction drops significantly.
Thus, incarcerating fewer drug offenders need not mean loss of crime
control. To the contrary, implementing alternative programs such as
Judge Alm's probation revocation system, Texas's DIVERT Court, and
the Chesterfield/Colonial Heights drug court into the law enforcement
system could result in significant efficiency gains because costs would
decrease while benefits increased. Yet without public pressure to save
money and reduce recidivism, government officials have little
motivation to increase the use and visibility of these programs at risk of
appearing soft on crime.
Mandatory cost disclosures could also result in fewer death penalty
prosecutions because death penalty cases are expensive. 229 North
Carolina could have saved $21.6 million had it abolished the death
penalty for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.230 In tight economic times, some
jurisdictions tend not to seek the death penalty in all but the most
heinous cases. 231 That trend has proven true recently on a national
level.232 New Mexico recently repealed its death penalty statute, and
Maryland has strictly limited its use of the death penalty.233
If prosecutors are forced to internalize the cost of public counsel in
their charging decisions because voters have access to that cost
information, prosecutors may view retained counsel cases as relatively
cheaper than appointed counsel cases. Prosecutors might then choose at
the margins to prosecute defendants who can afford counsel because
those cases would look cheaper on their disclosure forms. Such incentive
might alleviate the pervasive equity concern in criminal law that
defendants get as much justice as they can afford.234
228. Non-graduates were convicted of 250% fewer offenses than were similarly situated
offenders outside the program. Id.
229. One recent estimate calculates the cost as at least $3 million per case. Martin Kaste,
Opponents Focus on Cost in Death Penalty Debate, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 1, 2009),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102570588.
230. Philip J. Cook, PotentialSavingsfrom Abolition of the Death Penalty in North Carolina,11
AM. L. & EcON. REV. 498, 526 (2009).
231. Ratcliffe, supranote 153.
232. Kaste, supranote 229.
233. Id.
234. This concern stands in stark contrast to the eighteenth-century English system in which poor
criminals had an advantage over wealthy ones because they were judgment proof. Friedman, supra
note 24, at 490. Moving away from a system where wealthy defendants are less likely to face
incarceration would be a clear improvement from a Rawlsian perspective because a person behind
the veil of ignorance would not know whether she would be rich or poor and would thus hope for
equal justice for those two populations. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10-15 (rev. ed.
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While it is difficult to precisely predict the practical results that may
follow from mandatory cost disclosures, a more informed public will
instill greater efficiency concerns within prosecutors' offices and
promote greater accountability. Rather than bringing small drug
possession cases through the expensive, traditional prosecutorial system
that so frequently requires more spending on incarceration, this Article
hypothesizes that there is a greater place in America for alternative
programs that show promise for improving efficiency in criminal law
enforcement. Although there is room to question whether the American
people would tolerate a lower prison population and fewer traditional
prosecutions, recent state legislative action to modify these traditional
approaches seems to indicate that we would.235
CONCLUSION
Voters currently have woefully insufficient information about their
local prosecutors when they vote in prosecutor elections. Perhaps voters
hear a television ad reciting an overall conviction rate or read about a
high-profile case in the news media, but having these few data points is a
far cry from being thoroughly informed about concrete prosecutorial
priorities and resource expenditures. This lack of information defeats the
purpose of vesting the people's prosecutorial authority in an elected
official because there is no meaningful political check on the official's
exercise of that authority. Moreover, absent this check, prosecutors have
an incentive to consider only their own internal costs in determining
whether to file charges, what charges to file, and what sentences to later
recommend. If voters knew the full costs of criminal prosecution, such
as public defender expenses and prison costs, prosecutors would feel
compelled to internalize these costs when making cost-benefit decisions.
Accordingly, mandatory cost disclosures would improve the efficiency
of prosecutorial resource allocation and return sovereign authority over
criminal prosecution to the people. These disclosures could also help
control the cost explosion in state penal systems yet allow legislators to
avoid being branded with the toxic "soft on crime" label.

1999). Although most do not subscribe to this strict Rawlsian conception of justice, it seems quite
likely that most Americans do nonetheless consider disparity between the amount of legal fairness
afforded to rich and poor an injustice.
235. It bears reiterating here that prosecutors are not solely to blame for the current state of
criminal law enforcement. See supra note 8. Nonetheless, this Article has focused on their decisionmaking processes as the last clear chance to halt the criminal justice mechanism.
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Prosecutorial discretion is necessary in our current system but should
be employed to serve the people's law enforcement preferences.
Returning to a criminal justice system in which voters have meaningful
authority over what crimes are prosecuted in their names requires a
strengthened political check that is possible only when prosecutors
disclose the costs and details of their work to their constituents.

